Save yourself the trouble of reading about Syria...

Many years ago, while working as a waiter, I was taught the secret to carrying a tray full of overfull drinks across a crowded room without spilling. It's simple: don't look at the tray.

The problem is this: if you're looking at the drinks while you're walking, you'll try to compensate for the movement of the liquid in the glass based on what you see. And it won't work. Because all you're seeing is the liquid moving in response to things that have already happened. To avoid this, you simply look away – focus on where you're headed, and your hand will automatically compensate for whatever's happening on the tray.

I've been repeatedly reminded of this over the last few days as the pundit class (professional and amateur) have continuously tried to reanalyze the constantly changing calculus surrounding Syrian use of chemical weapons and the world's response. Every event, large or small, prompts a new wave of analysis that, interestingly enough, always seems to confirm whatever they said previously.

But I'm sure that's just a coincidence.

Confirmation bias aside, thanks to cable news, the internet, twitter, text messaging, Skype, and everything else, most of these pundits think they're looking at what's happening, but all they're looking at is what has already happened. I'm reminded of Walter Benjamin's description of the Angel of History (famously quoted in Benedict Anderson's "Imagined Communities”)

A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.

As the pundits seek to analyze the continuous flow of chaos and information, their inevitable fallback is the certainty of their own deeply held positions.

So, towards that end let me save you the trouble of reading any analysis of the US and its actions in relationship to Syria today (and possibly tomorrow). Here are most of your possible op-eds and analysis pieces:

1. Obama is terrible and everything he does is terrible! (a.k.a. "this is bad for Obama”). It's a nice, easy, and convenient approach that always has a guaranteed audience. The articles practically write themselves. All you need to do is look at whatever happened yesterday and explain: Whatever Obama did was the absolute worst possible thing he could've done and/or Whatever happened is the final step in Obama’s inevitable failure as a president

2. Obama is great and everything he does is great! This has two basic variations:
(2a.) Everyone else is playing checkers and Obama is playing 10 dimensional chess - he is always ahead of the curve and always has his next dozen moves plotted out in advance.
(2b.) In a chaotic situation where no one has control and none of the choices are good, Obama is such a genius that he always picks the best possible option

3. War is never the answer! This has two subcategories:
(3a.) Obama hates war and is trying to avoid it
(3b.) Obama is just like Bush and desperately wants us to go to war

4. Violence is the only language these guys understand! We must intervene because of (choose any or all of the following)
(4a.) Iran
(4b.) Israel
(4c.) Chemical Weapons


Additional elements that can be included as needed:

• The rebels are really Al-Qaeda/cannibals
• The rebels were the ones who did the gassing
• Oil pipeline across Syria

So there you have it. Pick one and stick with it no matter what anyone else tells you.


(Keep in mind; it’s much more important to know what a schmuck at CNN, Fox News, the Washington Post, or Politico thinks about this than…say…a Syrian.)

Some Follow-ups to Yesterday's "What to do on Syria?" Blog

As a follow-up to yesterday's blog post, I wanted to add some additional thoughts, as well as mentioning a few additional news items that crossed my radar.

Several other news sources have cited hints of Iran's internal discontent over Assad's use of chemical weapons. In particular, Iranwire posted some very interesting interviews with the various Iranians on the topic of Syrian chemical weapons and US intervention.
 
In spite of all this, let me be perfectly clear: I'm not suggesting that what I proposed yesterday would be easy. In spite of Iran's deep opposition to the use of chemical weapons, the loss of the Assad regime would be a major strategic blow to their standing in the Middle East. Iran has a long history of close relations with Syria, particularly post-1979 revolution, when Syria was one of the only countries in the Middle East to wholeheartedly support the removal of the Shah. Furthermore, Syria’s support during the Iran/Iraq war was vital to Iran's survival against Saddam Hussein’s assault. If Iran participated in the removal of Bashar Assad they would essentially be stabbing a longtime ally in the back.
 

For more information on the deep and complex relationship between Syria and Iran I highly recommend "Syria and Iran" by Jubin Goodarzi. It's extremely detailed and very dense, but quite rewarding.

Additionally, there would certainly be resistance to this idea within Saudi Arabia, the US, and among many of the Syrian rebel groups. If Iran is involved in the process of removing Assad, establishing a cease-fire, and restructuring an interim governmental authority there is the very real possibility that they could retain much of their deep organizational influence in a post-Assad Syria (indeed, they are unlikely to participate if this is not the case). Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been spending huge amounts of money to support many of the different rebel factions, and will not take kindly to anything less than a maximum return on that investment. Also, anti-Iranian sentiment is strong among many of the Syrian rebel groups, no small part due to the active presence and ruthless brutality of the IRGC  Quds Force soldiers who have been training, coordinating, and leading Syrian forces in their fight against the rebels.

Persuading Iran to participate in the negotiated removal of Assad and his inner circle will also take more than simply presenting convincing evidence of the regimes culpability in the use of chemical weapons, it will also be crucial that the US establish its own credibility on this issue. If the White House wants to be taken seriously on the unacceptability of chemical weapons it should make a formal apology for US involvement in the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran. Interestingly enough, last week released CIA files finally acknowledged what everyone has known for decades: the United States was complicit in facilitating Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons.

Given that this has been publicly acknowledged, it seems like a relatively small step for the US to issue a formal apology, which would do nothing but help our case against Assad and his chemical weapons usage. Furthermore, an apology of this nature would also strengthen the credibility of the US position against potential Iranian development of nuclear weapons capacity.

In related news, it looks like even the suggestion of US strikes has inspired a recent wave of regime defections, including some very high-profile individuals.

Also worth noting is Russia's shift to a “payment-up-front” system for major Syrian arms purchases, which suggests that they are not particularly confident in the Assad’s staying-power or ability to pay its bills on a long-term basis.

What to do on Syria.

The intractable conflict within Syria has finally reached a point where it is no longer possible for it to be ignored on the world stage. Certainly, it should've been addressed a long time ago in some fashion, but many of the parties outside of the country (on both sides of the conflict) have gained substantial benefits from the protracted conflict. 

Russia has been significantly enriched by arms sales at the expense of the Syrian government, while at the same time enjoying a prominent position on the global stage where they can flex the power of their position on the United Nations Security Council. Russia loves to publicly say "no" to the US - it makes them feel like they matter.

The US and Israel have also seen some significant benefits from this drawn-out stalemate - Hezbollah has suffered more casualties over the last two years then over the previous ten, and has been severely restricted in their ability to carry out anti-Israel activity. Additionally, although they have been receiving dramatically increased amounts of arms and funding from Iran, their resources are largely tied up in Syria at the moment. Furthermore, they have alienated many of their constituents in Lebanon with their insistence on direct engagement in a conflict that has nothing to do with Israel.

Iran's gains from the conflict are less clear, but they are deeply invested in the situation, partially due to the potential loss of one of their few stalwart allies in the Arab world, and partially due to the very real possibility that this conflict in Syria is simply a precursor to a larger region-wide Shia/Sunni conflict. (note: Although the Allawite sect of Islam has only been formally affiliated with Shia Islam for less than a century, thanks to the careful relationship-building of Hafez Assad, particularly following the Iranian Revolution in 1979, most of the Muslim world sees little or no difference between Allawites and the rest of the Shia community.)

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also deeply invested in the conflict, though the benefits to them have more to do with long-term regional power. A weakened or collapsed Syrian state would, by extension, diminish Iranian influence in the Arabian Peninsula, thereby providing opportunities for the continued growth of Saudi and Qatari power.

How, then, can this horrible situation be resolved?

Although no options are ideal options, there is a clear and (I feel) attainable path forward.

Right now, Pres. Obama is engaged in a two-pronged persuasion campaign - he's attempting to convince the United States Congress that the Syrian government was directly and unequivocally responsible for the massive use of chemical weapons in the Damascus suburbs on August 21. He is also, to a lesser extent, attempting to convince the American people that this is the case, and that it merits a clear response.

Although this course of action is, of course, necessary for the strategic path that he has chosen, Obama is working to convince the wrong people. A best-case scenario resolution for this entire situation is attainable, and the key to all of this is Iran.

Iran's distaste for the military use of chemical weapons,particularly against civilians, cannot be understated. Many of the now-senior members of Iran's various military, religious, and political factions witnessed the effects of chemical weapons firsthand during the Iran/Iraq war. These memories are fresh and distinct, and the Iranian regime has never hesitated to remind themselves and their neighbors of the horrific acts that Saddam Hussein committed on a horrifying scale.

The number one goal of the White House right now should be to present clear and convincing evidence of the Assad regime’s deliberate large-scale usage of chemical weapons against civilian populations.
Regardless of the tactical necessity for Iranian support of the Assad regime, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for high-level political, military, and religious officials in Iran to disregard the magnitude of Assad’s actions, particularly given their own experiences, and the deep physical, emotional, and psychological scars that much of the population still bears from their own encounters with chemical weapons.

A convincing case can then be made that Bashar Assad’s use of chemical weapons is clear grounds for his negotiated removal, and responsibility for his removal falls squarely in Iran’s lap. Assad, and most of the members of his senior leadership (i.e. family) would need to leave the country and go into exile, presumably in Iran or Russia (there's probably nowhere else on the planet where they'd be safe). Negotiations surrounding this issue will provide all active military groups (on all sides) a reasonable justification for a temporary cease-fire on the ground.

This is a win-win for many of the involved parties, particularly because it removes the specter of a zero-sum game from the conflict. If mid-level military Syrian leadership was actively engaged in the process of removing the high-level military leadership it would provide them with some measure of credibility in the eyes of the Syrian rebel groups. Similarly, if a temporary cease-fire holds, it could provide some measure of reassurance to the minority Allawite communities that this conflict was, at its core, a rejection of Assad’ legitimacy as a leader, rather than a sectarian war.

Certainly, any state that Syria will find itself in post-Assad is going to be a horrible one. There are substantial numbers of hard-line Islamists, many of whom are foreign fighters, and many of whom will see a resolution of this type as an unacceptable compromise. Additionally, there are civilian victims on both sides who will never be able to forgive the things they've suffered at the hands of the rebels and the Syrian government. The intensity and ruthlessness of the conflict is staggering, with casualty numbers that can only be estimated and the refugees returning from neighboring countries will face an overwhelming task of reconstruction.

In spite of that, there is still the possibility that this conflict can be slowed or stopped. The alternative is a continuously growing Shia/Sunni sectarian war that could ultimately stretch from Lebanon to Pakistan.

The question, then: is this possible?

There is some cause for optimism. Last week Iranian president Rouhani stated that the use of chemical weapons in this conflict was unacceptable and that the world should take immediate action to ensure that it did not happen again. A few days later, former Iranian president Rafsanjani publicly stated that he believed the Syrian regime was responsible for the chemical weapon usage (though the statement was taken off of the Internet within hours of being made). Additionally, Sultan Qaboos of Oman recently visited Iran to discuss a variety of issues. The country of Oman is one of the few regional entities enjoying excellent relations with both the American and Iranian governments, and the Sultan has served as an intermediary in conversations between the two countries in the past.

If Iran can take the lead in negotiating an abdication of leadership by Assad and a formal cease-fire on the part of the Iranian military and Hezbollah, then Turkey and Jordan will certainly be willing to come to the negotiating table to ensure compliance with the cease-fire on the part of the various Free Syrian Army groups that they are connected with. Some participation on the part of Saudi Arabia would be necessary to obtain cease-fire compliance by many of the hard-line Islamist groups, and some of those groups (particularly the al-Nusra Front and other groups with affiliations to Al Qaeda in Iraq) might refuse any cease-fire negotiations altogether, but even this limited transformation is dramatically better than what we see on the ground right now, and may well be a best case scenario for the entire conflict.

Even marginal stabilization would provide an opportunity for engagement by UN peacekeeping forces, and though it cannot be denied that some entities would use the cease-fire as an opportunity to rebuild their capacity for a future conflict, it's important to remember that every day that passes without shots being fired increases the odds that the next day will also pass without shots being fired.

...and it's not even friday!

Big things going on the last few days.

Egypt – major clashes between protesters and police again – hundreds or even thousands injured. Some have blamed former Mubarak insiders for provoking the incidents, but the anger has been hovering under the surface for weeks. The families of the 800+ people killed by the police during the Tahrir square protests have seen no justice - neither the police, the state secret police, nor the regime thugs and baltagi have been made answerable for their murderous brutality. The patience of a people who know their own power is running out. 

On a related note, the prosecution of the police responsible for the 2010 death of Kahled Said (one of the triggers of the Arab spring in Egypt), has been delayed until the end of this summer. In this case, however, the delay may be a good thing. The police under investigation were being charged with excessive force and illegal arrest, but the family of Kahled Said was able to introduce a second, independent, autopsy report as evidence, which may allow the charge of homicide to be added to the charges against the poilice – a much more serious charge that carries much stronger sentencing guidelines.

Lebanon – The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has finally released its first indictments in their investigation of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Arrest warrants against four Lebanese hezbollah members. Were issued and the Lebanese government has 30 days to serve the warrants. The prime minister has been a bit cagey about how far this will go, and many Hezbollah supporters are dismissing the whole thing as a us/Zionist plot to destabilize Lebanon. The individuals named are regarded as most directly connected to the actual carrying out of the act, while two more sets of indictments will be coming out later this year. It seems that the STL is going to work its way up the chain of authority, so the plotters and backers of the assassination won’t be targeted until the fall.

For extensive coverage and background on this check out the coverage here: http://qifanabki.com/2011/06/30/stl-indicts-four-suspects-in-hariri-murder/

Syria – Protests have hit Aleppo. This is a big deal – Aleppo is the industrial center of Syria and Assad's government cannot afford to turn the city’s residents against them.

Bahrain – Saudi Arabia started pulling troops out of Bahraintwo days ago and the Bahraini King gave a nice speech about justice yesterday and then turned his thugs loose on the protesters. Protesters were agressively dispersed by riot police using teargas and stun grenades indiscriminately. Check out https://twitter.com/#!/angryarabiya for updates.

In other news, police in Saudi Arabia arrested five woman drivers yesterday.

It figures. In Egypt and Bahrain protesters face clubs, rubber bullets, and tear gas. In Libya and Syria protesters face tanks and life ammunition. In Saudi Arabia you protest by taking your BMW for a spin around the block. Ah well. Baby steps.

Today is "blog4syria" day

I unfortunately don't have time to pull together a full post, so I'll direct you to Zenobia's piece "A day is not enough to blog about Syria"

Also, global voices online has a good roundup of some other posts on Syria here: http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/06/24/syria-blogging-day-for-syria/

If you're interested in learning a bit more about Syria's precariousness from a cultural standpoint, you should head over to Michael Dunn's blog at the Middle East Iinstitute website (which you are already reading, right? RIGHT?) In particular, he links to a great piece on Allawite identity called "The Alawi Dillema, revisited" which...well...you should just read it.

How good were my weekend predictions?

I was occupied with other things this past weekend, so on Wednesday night I posted a few predictions about what the weekend might have in store. Let's look at how I did:

***

Yemen - "Saleh is out by Monday or a full-fledged civil way will be underway"

Correct.

I know I hedged my bets with two possible outcomes, but between Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula taking over a town in south yemen, the entire Hashed tribe taking up arms against Saleh’s troops, Yemeni air force jet fighters doing air strikes on the Al-Qaida holdings and the Yemeni military attacking protesters elsewhere, I'd say this looks a lot like a civil war.

Interestingly enough, the opposition has insisted that they will continue to fight Al-Qaeda after Saleh is removed (and will even make a deal with the US to that effect). One of the reasons why the US has been tentative in its actions regarding Saleh is because he has actively participated in the US-led war on terror, particularly against AQAP. If the opposition can convince the State Dept that they are sincere in this offer it won't just peel the last vestiges of American support away from Saleh, it will actually earn the opposition some support (and probably some reconstruction funds from the US as well).

***

Syria - "High profile military defections and major violence on Friday"

Relatively accurate (but pretty vague too).

There have been several defections, but nothing high profile. As far as major violence, the horrific torture, murder, and mutilation of 13 year old Hamza Ali al-Khateeb by Syrian state security has spurred larger and angrier protests. Syrians are beginning to take up arms against the military which means we may see something more akin to Libya unfolding over the next week.

Here's the facebook page - We are all Hamza Ali al-Khateeb

***

Israe/Palestine - "Israeli Military strikes on Gaza within 24 hours of the permanent Rafah/Egypt border opening. Protesters get shot somewhere. Rockets from Gaza fail to hit anything."

I was off on all three points. This was a pretty pessimistic prediction on my part, and I’m happy to be wrong about this.

A few additional points on this topic - there haven’t been any missile attacks on Israel from gaza since the start of unity talks between Hamas and Fateh. This suggests two things -

1. Hamas doesn’t want to risk the talks falling through, so they’re keeping a tight lid on things.
Or
2. The assholes with the rockets are just waiting for the right time.

As far as protest-related violence, the Israeli military is expecting some next week in connection with the anniversary of the 1967 war (AKA the Six-day war).

***

Libya - "Tunisian troops exchange fire with pro-Gaddafi forces along the border. 3-5 more countries recognize the NTC by Monday"

I was wrong on both counts, probably because other things are finally moving forward. Lots of big stuff is finally happening, I’ll have a new libya-specific blogpost up on Tuesday to bring you up to speed.

***

Iran - "Ahmadinejad holds on to his authority for another week...barely."

Yea. His time seems to be rapidly running out, but he’s a pretty good at navigating the byzantine convolutions of the Iranian power game. After a week of bad news, Iran's supreme leader finally seems to be taking some of the pressure off of President Ahmadinejad.  If the President has convincingly been brought to heel he still has some life in him, but Khameni may just be setting him up for a bigger takedown.

***

Pakistan - "Three more major domestic terrorist attacks by Monday"

Another one where I’m happy to be wrong. There was only one attack.

***

Saudi Arabia - "More women driving in protest this weekend."

Nope. Just wishful thinking on my part. They formed a facebook group and tweeted about driving.

***

USA - "Obama will say/do something that is immediately declared to be the worst thing ever by several Republican Congressmen and Fox news."

He chewed gum in public. Truly he is history's greatest monster. 

***

Bahrain - "Nothing. No one will do anything to support the Bahraini people. Why? Because people suck sometimes."

Pretty much spot on, but the US has recalled a Human Rights diplomat from Bahrain due to a string of violent threats against him.

***

So. There you have it. Not a great showing, but not a terrible one either.

Look for a post on Libya later today...

Weekend predictions

I don't usually go for predictions, but I'll be out of town this weekend, so instead of trying to liveblog from my brother's wedding I'll just do some predictions now and see how I did on Monday.

Yemen - Saleh is done. My guess is he'll be gone by Monday (or there will be a full-fledged civil way underway).

Syria - High profile military defections and major violence on Friday..

Israe/Palestine - Israeli Military strikes on Gaza within 24 hours of the permanent Rafah/Egypt border opening. Protesters get shot somewhere. Rockets from Gaza fail to hit anything.

Libya - Tunisian troops exchange fire with pro-Gaddafi forces along the border. 3-5 more countries recognize the NTC by Monday.

Iran - Ahmadinejad holds on to his authority for another week...barely.

Pakistan - three more major domestic terrorist attacks by Monday.

Saudi Arabia - more women driving in protest this weekend.

US - Obama will say/do something that is immediately declared to be the worst thing ever by several Republican Congressmen and Fox news.

Bahrain - Nothing. No one will do anything to support the Bahraini people. Why? Because people suck sometimes.

Bad craziness in Egypt and other chaos elsewhere

Too much happened this past weekend for me to really cover it effectively, and much of my time was spent just keeping track of everything.

Syrian protests kept moving forward with substantial protests in every major Syrian city. The Syrian government deployed troops and tanks everywhere, and responded with violence, killing several but stopped short of outright massacre. I think Assad has realized that his use of lethal force against the protesters has brought him dangerously close to the point where his military will turn on itself, and there have been many reports of that very thing happening. That being said, Turkey (one of the only countries that has any notable leverage with Syria) has finally been taking steps to try and rein Assad in. America’s response to this has been lackluster, but we don’t really have much in the way of options. The withdrawal of our ambassador is really the last measure available to us, and that would severely limit our view into the actual situation on the ground and limit our avenues of communication with elements within the government and elsewhere. I’ll try to write more on that later. In the meantime, here’s an interesting piece on the dynamics of the political situation describing Bashir Assad as a “George W Bush surrounded by Dick Cheneys”

Israel’s fuel supply was tainted this past weekend, causing a few hours of paralysis at Ben Gurion airport. In a country where air travel is the primary means of leaving and entering the country an airline shutdown has disastrous implications. More on that here. Other things are afoot in Israel. The strategic balance seems to have shifted, most notably where Iran is concerned. Iran has been continuously touted as an existential threat to Israel for the past two decades, but most recently former Intel Chief Dagan came out and said what many of us have been insisting on for years – Iran just isn’t that big of a threat to Israel. Certainly their support for Hezbollah (and Hamas to a lesser extent) has caused tremendous strife and the shedding of no small amount of Israeli, Palestinian, and Lebanese blood, but the spectre of Iranian-caused nuclear destruction is absurd (and the idea that Israel could successfully destroy the Iranian nuclear program with airstrikes is rather far-fetched as well). Regardless, Israel has much more pressing issues to address right now. May 15 is Naqba day, the Palestinian counterpoint to Israeli independence day, and no one quite knows what to expect, but there will be a big march from Egypt to Gaza (some of the marching will be done in buses, apparently).

Iran’s weird leadership soap opera continues as well, and although Ahmadinejad has not yet tendered his resignation it seems pretty clear that the supreme leader feels that the president has outlived his usefulness. Outstanding analysis of the situation here,

I don’t really have time to cover it in any substantial form at this point because of the events elsewhere, specifically Egypt. Bad craziness. At least a dozen people dead, and two Coptic churches burned down by angry crowds. The whole mess was the result of a circulating rumor about a young woman who had converted to islam, but was being held captive in one of the churches. The most important piece written on this issue can be found over at the blog “rantings of a sandmonkey” who not only explains why the situation occurred, but points to a way forward for Egyptian muslims and Christians. This is, hands down, one of the best single blogs I’ve ever read on any topic ever. It’s long, but reading it will give you more insight into modern Egyptian culture and poilitics than any nagazine or newspaper article ever could – heartfelt, direct, and simultaneously heartbreaking and inspiring. READ IT.

More coming soon...

Three major shifts

Things seem to be picking up speed once again, and the last few days have seen some significant milestones for three of the countries we've been paying close attention to.

Yemen: frankly, my coverage of Yemen has been fairly weak compared to some of the other countries. Unfortunately, aside from some research I did several years ago concerning the reunification of North and South Yemen, it's not a country that I've really immersed myself in. Despite its small population, it is extremely diverse, with cultural influences coming from North and East Africa, Arabia, and South Asia, thanks to its advantageous location near the horn of Africa, the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and the coastal Arabian cities of Mecca and Medina.

Its glory days as a major link in both overland and sea trade are long past, and now it's largely known for his poverty and fractious infighting. two days ago, the GCC put forth a proposal whereby Saleh, the current president/dictator of Yemen would step down within the next 30 days, and free and fair elections would be held shortly thereafter in exchange for guarantees of immunity for himself and his people. Saleh seems to have accepted the plan (although that may not stand)  As encouraging as this news might be, there are some issues that do concern me.

1. The most obvious is the simple question of “will he leave office in 30 days?” It is, of course, entirely possible that he will abide by the GCC agreement, but he could also use the 30 day long to marshal his forces, eliminate key opposition members, and strengthen his position vis-à-vis the protesters in preparation for a major crackdown a month from now.

2. Then, there is the issue of the rest of the country. The idea of immunity from prosecution will likely stick in the craw of many who were on the receiving end of his brutality. Not only that, the protests in Yemen have been far less unified in any coherent sense than those in Egypt, Libya, or even Syria. Rather than a cohesive body of protesters, instead there are an abundant number of individual factions all of whom are interested in Saleh's departure from office, but with little shared objectives beyond that. A variety of post-election worst-case scenarios can be imagined, ranging from 1980s style Lebanese civil war to straight up Somalian style anarchy outside of a few controlled urban centers. As I've said from the beginning, I'm not all that optimistic about Yemen's potential for positive outcomes.

***


Libya – Things are definitely moving forward, but unfortunately this means that the regime is getting more desperate in its actions. For the last three days the people of Misrata have been steadily cleaning buildings full of mercenary snipers, with a wide range of foreign nationals being taken into custody by freedom fighters. Captured merc units include Sudanese, Syrians, and Algerians (including an Algerian Colonel) as well as many Libyan soldiers (including a pro-Qaddafi General). As the pro-Qaddafi forces have been eradicated from their strongholds in the city, their support outside the city has taken to shelling the city more heavily.

The NATO strikes have certainly been moving things forward, taking down several of the Libyan state television stations and destroying two of the main buildings in Ghaddafi’s main compound in Tripoli Bab Al-Azizaya today. Additionally, the gas shortage in Tripoli has escalated to the point where there is none left for nonmilitary usage - this is bad news for everyone in the city, but ultimately it moves us that much closer to angry mobs dragging brother leader out into the streets.

***

While Libya is moving closer to conclusion, Syria is ramping up. Blood in the streets. Tanks, live ammo. I highly recommend this piece http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2011/04/24/syrian-protesters-cut-down-weeds Body count is past 200, and still climbing. Not much to say. It’s awful.

Ynetnews editorial - Ignorance or Ideology?

Bad ideas...

As I’ve said before, I’m a generalist when it comes to the Middle East. There are some areas that I know better than others, but there’s no one aspect or region that I can point to as a singular area of expertise. My primary interest is synthesis – making sense of broad aggregates of data on a variety of topics. This means that I will sometimes come to rather different conclusions than those reached by people with a narrower but deeper view of specific area.

Case in point - this FP piece on the Syrian uprising. The author reads it as much less of a genuine people’s movement at work, and instead sees the fingerprints of the MB and other insurgent militant elements all over it. Frankly, I think some of what she’s seeing is what she wants to see, and much of her interpretation doesn’t jibe with what I’ve been following online, but her conclusions are not unreasonable, and she certainly has some windows into the situation that I don’t have.

So I read the article, make some mental notes, maybe follow up on a few things, and continue about my day.

Sometimes, however, I read material that is so shockingly idiotic that it gnaws at me for days. Not the casual ignorance of a YouTube “comments” section, or the absurd conjecture of buffoons like Joseph Farah at World Net Daily – I can laugh at things like that, shake my head, and move on.

No, I’m referring to material like the following Ynetnews.com editorial, which reveals a staggering degree of willful ignorance and ideological blindness by someone who should know better.

Almost every single paragraph of this article contains either a gross distortion of fact or a deliberate dismissal of truth (often both). Crass propaganda from top to bottom.

I’m not going to do a point-by-point rebuttal, but I want to point out a few specific things

Israel’s leadership is more loyal to its Arab allies than President Obama. While Israel stood by Mubarak, it took Obama three days to call for Egypt’s president, a long term US friend, to leave office and to threaten him with foreign aid cuts. It seems that Obama only confronts and abandons allies, but prefers not to meddle in the internal revolts of enemies like Syria and Iran.

She says this like it’s something to be proud of. Israel supported brutal regimes in Argentina and South Africa long after almost every other country in the world had turned against them. Why would this be a positive argument for stronger ties to Saudi Arabia?

Not only that, the US state department was meddling in the internal revolts in Syria and Iran since before they were revolts. Israel often boasts of being the only democracy in the region (a statement whose veracity is contingent on some semantic juggling) and yet the author is advocating allying with the least democratic country in the region to strike against one of the countries that is closest to internal revolution. When Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in the 1980’s he gave the unstable fledgling Islamic Iranian Republic an external foe to unify against, strengthening their national identity, and legitimizing Ayatollah Khomeini’s position as the undisputed leader of the Iranian people. Cooperative action by Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran would give their currently unstable regime a means to reunify and would undo years of internal and external work towards Iranian regime change.

Third, Iran is the main danger to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf states, not Israel, as the WikiLeaks cables revealed, with Saudi King Abdullah repeatedly imploring Washington to “cut off the head of the snake” (Iran) while there was still time.

Iran is certainly a danger to Saudi Arabia, primarily to the Saudis’ chokehold on the region through wealth and wealth-based influence. The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, currently being fought through proxies around the M.E. (Particularly in Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq) is ultimately about two things – commerce and legitimacy. The Saudis have gotten to where they are through careful negotiation, leverage, coercion and intimidation, but ultimately, they are where they are because they have more oil than everyone else. Their regional religious dominance comes from successful negotiation for authority over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and then spending vast quantities of money to propagate their extremist brand of fundamentalist Islam to the rest of the Muslim world.

Fifth, establishing a Palestinian state is not in the best interest of Saudi Arabia or Israel. As previously happened after Israel withdrew its military forces from Gaza in 2005, Hamas will be able to take over the new state by winning subsequent Palestinian elections, as it did in 2006, or by militarily defeating the PA, as it did in 2007. Such state would become another Iranian base, threatening Israel but also destabilizing Jordan next door and encircling the Saudis from the northwest.

This is just fear-mongering that is rooted in ignorance, denial, or outright deception. An established Palestinian state would be terrible news for Hamas (and for Fateh), an issue I’ve addressed before and one that I’ll probably address again soon.

The essential problem with this piece is that it was written by someone who has confused presenting a convincing-sounding argument with being factually correct – the technical term for this is “Lawyer”.

More updates...

So here’s where we’re at: the old orders have dug their heels in. They will hold out as long as they can by any means necessary.

It’s been hard to write updates, because although things are happening, they are mostly small advances, or gradual increases in scale.

This is particularly true in Libya, where the freedom fighters have made remarkable strides, none of which seem dramatic to the outside observer. With elements of the former Libyan military leading the anti-Gaddafi campaign the dramatic back-and-forth capture of towns and cities has ended. The rebel army is moving steadily forward in a coordinated fashion, taking and holding key points as they move west.

The pro-Ghaddafi forces have taken a different track, turning their attention to the isolated towns in the mountainous regions, where they have been wreaking havoc outside of the NFZ/civilian defense umbrella. The results have been horrific, but there is little that the rebels can do to assist. Meanwhile, not far from Tripoli the rebel-held city of Misrata has continued in its persistent defiance of Ghaddafi’s repeated attacks. The fact that attacks have continued on the city speaks to its importance as a symbol for bothe sides of the conflict. As long as the rebels hold the city it cannot be said that the rebellion is simply a regional phenomenon, and the longer it holds out, the weaker Ghaddafi looks to his supporters.

Some highlights from the past 12 hours:

• NATO 18 Apr: 1 building destroyed near #Brega #Libya (nature of building not given)
• NATO 18 Apr: 3 tanks, 1 anti-aircraft weapon system and 1 armoured vehicle destroyed near Zintan
• NATO 18 Apr: 6 SAMs, 4 tanks, 3 air defence missile sites and 1 mobile rocket launcher were destroyed near Misrata
• NATO 18 Apr: 3 ammunition storage bunkers destroyed near Sirte
• NATO 18 April: 9 ammo bunkers and HQ of 32nd brigade destroyed in Tripoli
• CONFIRMED: NATO hit "Khamis Brigade" Gaddafi 's son HeadQuarter 10km South of Tripoli several times last night

As I’ve said before, despite the persistence of those who predict a Libyan stalemate the pro Ghaddafi forces are losing ground steadily. For more on the situation in misrata and Libya in general I will again direct you to libyafeb17.com

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Some regimes elsewhere have had some success in making concessions while controlling the protests – particualry Morocco and to a lesser extent Oman (though some things seems to be brewing there). Jordan and Lebanon seem to be far more concerned with issues of ethno-national self-identity than the otherwise prevalent issue of simple dignity (not because they aren’t concerned with dignity, but more because their very existence as nation-states is intimately intertwined with issues of ethnicity and self-identity)

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Syrian protests have grown continually since last week – Assad seems weirdly paralyzed by ambivalence, probably a result of his delay in responding to the situation quickly enough. This response-delay has been one of the hallmarks of the “Arab Spring” – the Arab leaders repeatedly ignored or neglected the stirrings of discontent, or answered them with half-assed measures to placate very serious concerns. Of course, now that the angry mobs have toppled two long-standing dictators the Middle Eastern regimes are taking them much more seriously.

Be that as it may, things might have already gone too far too fast for Assad. The Syrian regime was one of the few that was initially deemed safe from upheaval due to the regime’s chokehold on society in general, but even despite the brutality evidenced by his military and police force (who may be under the authority of one of his cousins) he still hasn’t taken a decisive step in any direction yet.

Slight side note - Friends who spent any amount of time in Syria always commented on the security that they felt while living and traveling there.

“There’s no crime!” they said. “I never felt unsafe the whole time I was there!”

Their enthusiasm reminds me of a comment by an older Italian man that I used to know who would regularly reminisce about Italy’s fascist era. “Under Mussolini, if someone would steal even a cabbage from your garden, he would leave a coin on the stem where he cut it off with his knife. ”

So, anyway, Syria’s protofascist era seems to be seriously at risk.

Yesterday one of the leading Sunni religious leaders publicly condemned the Assad regime for their indiscriminate actions against protesters and every day the protests grow steadily. Interestingly, the Syrian regime has set up several twitter accounts to flood the twitterverse (twittersphere?) with random minutia under the #Syria hashtag. This piece identifies some of the more prominent twitter spammers, but if you’re looking for a few reliable Syrian tweeters here are a few that I’ve been following:

https://twitter.com/SyrianJasmine
https://twitter.com/Shoruk_K
https://twitter.com/SilmyaSilmya
https://twitter.com/AnonymousSyria
https://twitter.com/SultanAlQassemi
https://twitter.com/shadihamid

Just an hour or two ago it was announced that the long-standing "Emergency Law" has been revoked (accompanied by an order outlawing the protests)
Too little too late, most likely.

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Yemen unfortunately hasn't been at the forefront of my radar, but here's a good timeline if you need to figure our where we're at: http://www.timetoast.com/timelines/131956 

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Bahrain continues to be brutal. The government has been employing vicious tactics to hold the protests at bay – bloggers and twitterers are being detained continually, brutality abounds, and dozens have died. I must emphasize that the death toll is deceptively small – Bahrain is a country with a population of a little over a million. The approximately 30 reported deaths in Bahrain are equivalent to 600 deaths in a country the size of Syria, or 2400 in a country the size of Egypt.

Saudi Arabia seems to have chosen Bahrain as a line in the sand, as though to say “political unrest will come no closer”, and given their ridiculous quantities of money they may be successful in quelling the uprising on behalf of the Bahraini royals, but I expect the cost to be terrible. This is a situation that desperately calls for a stronger voice from both the UN and the US, but any political wrangling that takes place will be messy and fraught with seriously negative outcomes for the US.

Bringing you up to speed...

Sorry for the rather substantial drop in output on my part. In the absence of any reasonable excuses, I’ll blame twitter. (You have been following my twitter feed, right?)

Well, there’s a lot to cover, so let’s get to it…

Libya still leads in the news, and at this point it seems as though the only thing holding the Libyan government together is utter terror. In addition to the defection Moussa Koussa on Sunday, another high profile defector got out of the country two days ago. As the article mentions, we aren’t seeing more defections because anyone who leaves the country without their family is endangering their lives.

The most substantial change In Libya has been General Abdel-Fattah Younis’ return to a military leadership role for the Liberation forces. Younis, a former Libyan Interior Minister, was one of the early high-profile defections from the pro-Ghaddafi camp. He initially assumed a leadership position, commanding a brigade of other Libyan army defectors. This created some conflict among the rebel forces, many of whom questioned his fitness for command (given his long career as a Libyan government insider). Additionally, the rapid initial success of the rebels had bolstered their confidence in their own ability to overcome Gaddafi’s military, and they wanted to preserve the spontaneous nature of the uprising, rather than rely on military assistance (this is also why they initially opposed the idea of a no-fly zone).

General Younis stepped back from his leadership role, and the anti-Gaddafi military forces took a backseat in the fighting until the rebels began to lose in a spectacular fashion a few weeks ago. Even with the advent of the NATO no-fly zone/civilian protection order, there seems to have been continuing debate over the military’s role in the revolution. It was only a few days ago that Younis was restored to his leadership role, something that probably should have happened some time ago.

With Younis in command, the rebels on the front lines (recklessly courageous, but under-equipped, untrained, and unguided) have been supplemented and/or replaced by actual soldiers. Facing stronger opposition, Gaddafi’s forces have redirected some of their attention to the small undefended southern towns that are opposing him but have not yet been integrated into the resistance.

As the Libyan conflict has unfolded, it has caused some major strategic realignment in both Africa and the Middle East. This can be seen in the recent actions of Algeria, Turkey, Jordan, and Qatar.

Algeria has been serving as a main conduit for the arms and mercenaries flowing towards Ghaddafi, a fact that will probably soon bite Algerian president Boutiflaka's regime in the ass. Like Libya, (and unlike Tunisia and Egypt) Algeria’s military serves as an enforcement wing of the ruling party, and Ghaddafi’s failure to stop the Libyan uprising with brute force means that Algeria may have a similar fate in store for them. Not only that, their actions in support of Ghaddafi will not likely be forgotten in a post-Gaddafi state.

Turkey’s role in the Libyan situation has been deeply ambivalent, which has created a great deal of frustration towards turkey on the part of many Libyans. Although they initially opposed intervention, they followed that by assuming a prominent role in NATO’s actions in the Med. They have tried to position themselves as potential interlocutors between Qaddafi and the rest of the world, while decrying his brutality but they don't seem to have been successful with either side of the conflict.

Jordan, on the other hand, has conclusively settled itself on the side of the Anti-Ghaddafi forces by becoming the third Arab country to contribute planes to the NFZ/civilian protection action. This may be a move by the King to strengthen his support among his base. Jordan is fairly unique, demographically - close to 2/3 of its population is ethnically Palestinian, which creates a very odd power dynamic. (Anyone who says that Palestinians are really Jordanians is slinging BS or playing semantic games). For a better understanding of the Jordanian situation (and why there won’t be a revolution in Jordan any time soon) I highly recommend this blog post. King Hussein of Jordan is a sharp guy, and the advantages of having good relations with the emerging new Libyan state are pretty clear.

Qatar, more than any other Arab nation, has recognized the opportunities that a new Libya represents. Their enthusiasm for the NFZ/civilian protection action was evident from the start. I get the impression that the Qatari government sees the future of the Arab world more clearly than any of their neighbors, and has been taking bold steps to ensure their place in it, despite their small size and limited oil resources. Towards this end, they have already signed agreements with the provisional government in Benghazi to purchase a tanker full of oil. (Note – most Libyan oil is what they call “Light Sweet Crude” - extremely high-grade oil that requires less refinement and purification than most other types of crude oil.)

All of these Libya-centered power struggles can be seen as expressions of a larger struggle – the push for stronger standing on the international stage and in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Saudi Arabia is probably the strongest player in the GCC, given their close ties to every US administration since Nixon and their staggering oil wealth. For the past 30+ years Saudi Arabia has been furthering its interests in a number of ways, and one of the most notable is the promulgation of its own distinctive Wahabist brand of Sunni Islam. Wahabism is a particularly conservative strain of Salafism, a strict back-to-basics rigidly fundamentalist form of Islam. Salafism, especially the Wahabist variations, has little tolerance for alternate interpretations of Islam and the Quran, which has created some serious conflicts within the Muslim world – especially with Shi’a and Sufi Muslims.

This is important to note because expressions of the Salafi vs. Sufi conflict have been flaring up in Egypt lately – in particular several Sufi shrines have recently been destroyed by Salafist mobs. Sufis regard the burial places of their saints and teachers as being somewhat sacred and often use them as places of prayer and pilgrimage, a practice that Salafis regard as tantamount to idolatry or even heresy. (Note – don’t confuse the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood. The MB represents and includes a much more diverse range of Islamic expression.)

I raise this issue because Saudi Arabia heavily funds their Salafist brethren in Egypt and the increasingly aggressive public actions by Egyptian Salafis carries the imprimatur of Saudi interference. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are not known for cordial relationships with each other, but the recent events are likely to drive even more wedges between the two states and push Egypt towards the other big player in the Gulf – Iran.

The Middle East realignment can also be seen in some notable recent events in Syria (though in some rather counterintuitive ways). Shortly after the protests in Daraa started rapidly escalating the King of Saudi Arabia called Bashir Assad to assure him of Saudi Support. This is strange for a number of reasons, but most particularly because for the past 40+ years Syria has been either loosely or tightly aligned with the Baathist/Nasserist bloc of Arab nationalists (particularly Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and to a lesser extent Libya and Algeria). This group has traditionally been locked in competition with the pan-Islamist royalists, especially Saudi Arabia. Not only that, but Assad, his family, and the rest of the Syrian government are Alawites, a sect of Shi’a Islam (remember what I just said about Salafis/Wahabis and Shi’a?).

One of the commonly heard chants in the streets of Syria last week was "No Iran, no Hezbollah, we want a Muslim who fears God." (it's catchier in Arabic) The accusation that Assad is insufficiently religious seems to have struck a nerve, and Assad seems to be trying to get more support from the religious conservatives in Syria by rolling back some of the social reforms of the past few years. (He’s not rolling back political reforms because there haven’t really been any) It could be that he’s backing away from Iran and towards Saudi Arabia to preserve his power structure. He's also taking big steps to gain the favor of Syria's substantial disenfranchised Kurdish population.

More on Syria's tenuous stability here.

Well…that’s plenty for now. Barring some other major upheaval I’ll be getting around to addressing Iraq and Bahrain this weekend.

A whole mess of updates from all over!

Friday is always a big day in the Middle East.  Just about every single major protest or rally that has taken place from Morocco to Iran has reached its peak after Friday evening prayers.  Yesterday was no exception, and today seems like a good day to sort out some of the events from the past few days and try and make sense of where things are in the Middle East.

The first point to mention is my recent entry into the world of Twitter. I’ve been following multiple Twitter feeds for quite some time (beginning back in 2009 with the Iranian post-election protests), but I’ve been leery of going any deeper into that chaotic yammering mass.  My time at the nonprofit technology conference last week however convinced me that it was no longer something I could reasonably avoid.

My Twitter name is ixakRubicon, but if you’re not on Twitter you can also see my “tweets” on the right column feed of this blog. I’ll be mostly using the feed to share links and “re tweet” notable tweets from other people that I’m following.  I promise, I won’t be using it to talk about my new haircut (which is spiffy), what I ate for breakfast (egg sandwich), or what the guy next to me on the train yesterday smelled like (urine).

If you are among the twitterati, please follow me. It gives my life purpose and meaning.

Now on to the things that matter:

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Libya - rebels are making progress once more.  Pro-Qadhafi forces have retreated from the besieged cities of Misrata and Ajdabiya.  There have also been reports of tanks and armored trucks being abandoned by the pro-Qadhafi forces because of fuel and ammunition shortages (remember what I said the other day about supply chains?).

White House comments on America's involvement in the NFZ+ can be found here if you missed them, with a more extensive speech coming on Monday. Steve Negus has some relevant comments over at thearabist.net - "Consensus vs Clarity"

The US role in the operation has been downgraded, with NATO taking the leadership role and the majority of the sorties being flown by French and British planes as well as several miscellaneous European countries and Canada.  Fighter planes from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are also participating, though it should be pointed out that Qatar is one of the only countries in the ME that hasn’t had major protests (it is also the home of Al Jazeera), and the UAE may have committed planes in order to buy themselves some slack for their participation in the Bahrain crackdown. Nonethless, the participation in this campaign by Arab governments should not be taken lightly.

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The United Arab Emirates have also made another interesting move with some ambiguous geopolitical ramifications. They have joined the African Union as officially recognized observers.  This is notable for a few reasons, most immediately the contrast between their active participation in airstrikes on Libya and the denunciation of those attacks by the African Union. Their respective diferences over Libya, this certainly indicates a heightened degree of interest in Africa by the UAE, presumably for commercial reasons, but potentially for other reasons as well.

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In Yemen,  talks of a potential  power transfer are under way, possibly over the next few days.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/26/us-yemen-idUSTRE72M92520110326

http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/26/yemen.president.interview/index.html

Frankly, this may be little more than a stalling tactic on the part of the current president - power would most likely be transferred into the hands of one of his supporters.  Despite the fact that nothing really seems to be happening beyond talking, it’s still too early to write off the power transfer idea. The fact that the people of Yemen have been able to push Saleh this far means that they can probably push further.

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On the topic of elections, Egypt’s Wafd party is showing its true colors, stating that they are opposed to any international election monitoring in the fall (Google translate version here). Reaction to the statement has yet to be seen on a wide scale, but initial reactions have been (predictably) outrage and anger by the youth who participated on the protest movement.

Another interesting event took place in Egypt as well.  Two of the men responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat were released from jail a few days ago. This is part of a very complex power play by the military that I’m still trying to decode. I’ll try to keep you apprised of the situation as clarity comes.

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Some interesting power struggles going on in Gaza as well, as Hamas tries to rein in the violent actions of Islamic Jihad.

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In Jordan there have been some protests calling for a transition to a constitutional monarchy, but it remains to be seen whether or not they will gain traction. There have also been robust counter-protests - The King of Jordan still enjoys strong support from certain sections of the country, and some angry rhetoric has been flying back and forth over the issue. A heartfelt and melancholy account of a March24 protest can be found here: "The Quick Death Of Shabab March 24 And What It Means For Jordan" I HIGHLY reccommend it. The author really cuts to the heart of the issue in Jordan, and why reform of the type that we are seeing elsewhere may be a long time coming in Jordan.

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The situation in Syria keeps getting more and more serious (or should I say Syrias?). Protesters burnt down a Baath party headquarters today and the protests continue to escalate in response to the governments violent attempts to suppress them.

An interesting consequence of the current situation in Syria is that Hezbollah has positioned itself very squarely on the side of Assad, a strategic decision that will probably come back to bite them in the ass later on.  The Alawite sect of Islam that Assad and his core supporters belong to is viewed with some suspicion by many of the more conventional Sunni Arabs of Syria.  The government’s close ties to the Shiites of Hezbollah and to the Iranian government have give the unhappy parts of the population ammunition for accusations of borderline heresy.

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On the topic of Iran, an additional point to mention – the US government is considering dropping Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) from the list of international terrorist organizations, a move that could have a serious negative impact on the homegrown Iranian green movement.  Excellent article describing the situation over at salon.com http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/03/26/iran_green_movement/index.html

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There is also some positive State Department news - they have developed a nifty piece of software called the “Panic Protester Button”, a phone app that can be activated if a protester is about to be arrested. If the “panic” button is pressed the phone immediately erases all saved contact information from the phone and sends an emergency alert to other activists. This useful little piece of software shows an encouraging degree of innovation and adaptability on the part of our own State Department, (though an independently developed third-party version probably has a better chance of widespread adoption in places where the US government is viewed with almost as much suspicion as the local government.

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One last thing to mention: Sudan – Protests against Omar al-Bashir are still trying to take off. I’ll keep you posted on those.

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Well, that’s all for now, thanks for tuning in, and don’t forget to follow me on Twitter!

Syria!

So, where are we at?

An issue I neglected to address in Tuesday mornings post on the Palestinian protests is that March 15 was supposed to be a “day of rage" for Syria as well.

It's not that I didn't think it was important, but I didn't think that we would see much of it. In a region full of repressive regimes, Syria is one of the worst. The state security apparatus is frighteningly effective, and government has shown itself more than willing to use excessive force on many occasions. These, in conjunction with a relatively stable population have led me to leave the Syrian regime in the "safe" column as far as political upheaval goes.

True to form, the protests in Syria were small and quickly controlled by Syrian police. Some arrests, and some violence for sure, but that was the end of it.

Or so I thought…

While I and many others were focused on the dramatic events transpiring in Libya something surprising happened in Syria - the protests continued.

Egyptian blogger Zenobia commented on Tuesday night,

"If our dear Syrian brothers and sisters managed to protest till Friday , till the Friday prayers it will be a great triumph."

Although I am a devoted reader of her blog, at I was busy thinking about Libya, Bahrain, and Palestine and I failed to take note of her prediction.

As it turns out she was right. Syria is no longer on the safe list.

(Other countries currently on the safe list are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. The way things are going, however I may need to move a few of them over the next month or two).

Anyway, Syria. Big deal for sure. I was hoping that Qaddafi's brutality would serve as a "don't go there" sign for other Middle East tyrants, but unfortunately that seems not to be the case (particularly in Yemen and Bahrain). Instead, what seems to have happened is that the Syrian people are taking their lead from the Libyans.

Unabashed defiance in the face of almost certain death, injury, or incarceration.

Large scale protests in five Syrian cities.

Police using live ammunition on protesters in the streets.

Citizens storming a state security building.

Basically like a mini Egypt in fast-forward.

Rather than simply reiterating what has already been posted, I'll direct you to Zenobia's blog where she has some excellent coverage. She's an enthusiastic and devoted blogger - I don't always agree with her interpretations, but she takes her work very seriously and does an outstanding job of reporting events as she sees them.

Anyway, once again, all bets are off.

Here's to the Arab Spring...

Situational Updates - what's going on where?

400+ pageviews in less than a week! Thanks to all of you who have been tuning in. The fact that people are checking out this site helps motivate me to keep writing, so please share this site with your friends and don't hesitate to give feedback.

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First, a point of personal frustration – the Egypt issue certainly deserves attention, but it's sucking up almost all of the news right now. Given the limits of most foreign news agencies’ Middle East division, we certainly aren’t getting the wider picture. Al Jezeera is better than many, but with finite resources. I have little doubt that the germ of similar events is being carefully extinguished in many other countries while the world watches Egypt.

That being said, events in Syria have gotten some attention - Assad  has moved from the denial stage of the Kubler-Ross model to the bargaining stage. Two days ago the Syrian state media apparatus was claiming that the Egyptian protesters were calling for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador - part of the classic, “when in doubt, blame Israel” strategy that is so often the norm in the Islamic sections of the Mediterranean. Today his tune has changed and his attention has shifted to domestic affairs, claiming that Arab rulers need to do more to accommodate their people's rising political and economic aspirations. Assad's obvious intention here is to appease the Syrians before thousands of them end up in the streets. His strategy is probably a sound one - dispense visible (but limited) reforms, and do his best to distinguish himself from Mubarak. It may or may not work - I think it will for the time being (i.e. the next six to twelve months).

Yemen seems to be trying the same tactic, but they’re a day late (3-5 days, really) and a dollar short. I have far less faith in their ability to pull such a thing off, and I fear that there is ugliness and long-term instability in store for the country.

Meanwhile, back in Tunisia where this whole thing started, the two highest profile Tunisian opposition leaders returning from European exile show serious promise for a positive outcome for the country - Moncef Marzouki and Rashid Al-Ghannushi. It is, of course, still too soon to tell what the response will be. (I should probably just end every paragraph with that qualifier and be done with it.)

Events in Sudan since the partition vote have gotten…interesting (for lack of a better term). As the country seeks to resolve a procedural debate over to whether it was 98% or 95% that voted for partition, some protests are popping up in the north against President Omar al Bashir. It's a small factor right now (though it spurred some violent government reaction) but stay tuned…

So -Who aren’t we hearing about?

Libya and Morocco in particular have been awfully silent for the past few days. The King of Morocco is visiting France right now, which may or may not be  a coincidence - Morocco is hardly a police state and not really capable of an Egyptian-style media lockdown, and so the lack of protest buzz is probably not indicative of something more sinister. 

Libya, on the other hand, is locked down tighter than an off-color reference to batrachian anatomy. Ghaddafi, in a rare moment of discretion, has actually shut up, which speaks volumes about how serious his situation must be at this point. 

On that note, it’s never a good sign when Ghaddafi is exercising more tact and judiciousness than your own leaders – Israel, I’m looking at you.

Israel is doubling-down on the stupid. A conflict of opinions is to be expected - arguing politics is the national sport of Israelis, but a sense of panic has begun to seep into the editorial columns and blogs. The Israeli government has been telling their diplomats to pull for Hosni in their host countries. "We must therefore curb public criticism against President Hosni Mubarak” they were told on Friday. A comment like this reeks of either denial or idiocy (or both…it can always be both).

• They’re not doing Mubarak any favors by pulling for him.
• They’re not doing themselves any good by hitching their wagon to a dying donkey.

Oh well…if the Israeli government wants my advice I’m sure they can figure out how to get a hold of me.

On that note, one more state has formally recognized Palestinian statehood within the ’67 borders, and this time it’s not a random South American country. Cyprus, one of the most popular Israeli vacation destinations in the world, sent Abbas a letter of recognition today. Frankly, if Abbas can keep pulling these in he may survive the fallout from the al Jazeera leaks.

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Well, that's it for now, I'm sure tomorrow will bring new revelations. Stay tuned for a piece on the Muslim Brotherhood and Part Two of my piece on Self-Immolation in the next few days - maybe tomorrow, if the snow cancels my other plans.