Some thoughts on yesterday’s 9/11 Benghazi hearing

As I watched the hearing committee go back and forth over the circumstances surrounding the 9/11 Benghazi attack it became painfully evident that there were two issues being discussed, almost entirely independently from each other.

The first of these was the security failure. Key personnel asked for more security and Deputy Assistant Secretary Lamb rejected the request. In retrospect this was a supremely bad move on her part. Ms. Lamb obviously has a lot on her plate, and the security demands of Benghazi were evidently just one among dozens of locations demanding attention and resources.

This is the sort of unpleasant, boring, and banal allocation work that is the hallmark of mid-level management - the drudgery of budgetary concerns combined with the sort of administrative decision-making that inspires resentment in your subordinates and contempt in your superiors. The type of work that exists in the middle strata of corporations, schools, government agencies, militaries, and any other top-down mass human endeavor where someone is needed to nitpick over financial minutia.

DAS Lam was most likely doing her job the way she's always done it – attending to the letter of the law, with less of an eye towards its spirit. A different string of decisions on her part probably wouldn’t have enabled the security staff to repel the attacks, but some of those who died that night might still be alive today.

This is certainly an awful state of affairs, and Ms. Lamb should've had the decency to tender her resignation sometime over the past month, but it’s hardly a cause for a Congressional hearing. Deadly attacks on embassies and consulates are far less common now than they were during the Regan years, but they still happen on a regular basis. Note the following:

·         June 14, 2002, U.S. consulate in Karachi, Pakistan - Suicide bomber kills 12 and injures 51. 

·         February 20, 2003, international diplomatic compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia - Truck bomb kills 17.

·         February 28, 2003, U.S. consulate in Karachi, Pakistan - Gunmen on motorcycles killed two consulate guards. 

·         July 30, 2004, U.S. embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan - Suicide bomber kills two.   

·         December 6, 2004,U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia - Militants stormed and occupied perimeter wall. Five killed, 10 wounded.   

·         March 2, 2006, U.S. consulate in Karachi, Pakistan - Suicide car bomber killed four, including a U.S. diplomat directly targeted by the assailants. 

·         September 12, 2006, U.S. embassy in Damascus, Syria - Gunmen attacked embassy with grenades, automatic weapons, and a car bomb (though second truck bomb failed to detonate). One killed and 13 wounded.

·         July 9, 2008, U.S. consulate in Istanbul, Turkey - Armed men attacked consulate with pistols and shotguns. Three policemen killed.   

·         September 17, 2008, U.S. embassy in Sana'a, Yemen - Militants dressed as policemen attacked the embassy with RPGs, rifles, grenades and car bombs. Six Yemeni soldiers and seven civilians were killed. Sixteen more were injured. 

The second issue at play in the hearing was a very different one: the shifting statements regarding the attack that were issued by the State Department and the White House. This is where pundits grow shrill, and certain committee members start to yell. This is also where ignorance and idiocy vigorously rears its head.

Why did the State Department, and in particular ambassador Rice, make such an obviously incorrect statement regarding the nature of the attacks on the Embassy? And why did they maintained that line for almost a week when everyone knew that any connection between the notorious anti-Islamist video and this specific attack was minimal at best?

The answer to this is simple, and for those who were watching the testimony of Ambassador Kennedy it should have been painfully obvious. The official statements by Susan Rice and the others during the first week after the attacks were strictly limited to what they were given permission to say by the CIA.

It wasn’t based on the “intelligence we had at the time”. It was very strictly controlled messaging under orders from the CIA. In spite of the clear inconsistencies between Rice’s statement and the obvious facts on the ground, the script that the White House and the State Department had to stick to was the one they had been given by the CIA. Until the D/CIA gave them a new script, it's all they could say.

(Frankly, in their rush to politicize this incident, the Oversight Committee has done a major disservice to the CIA, and created additional danger for their on-the-ground ops in Libya)

The building that was attacked in Benghazi was a base of operations for the CIA, and a consulate in name only. This attack was a major intelligence failure on the part of the CIA, and they are in the middle of a very serious investigation into the particulars (which is why yesterday’s committee didn’t get access to the security videos, among other things). As such, any information about their intelligence capacity before, during or after the event is going to be heavily scripted, controlled, and often times deliberately misleading.

You can be assured that the White House and the State Department know far more about the incident than they can publicly admit, and they’re not going to formally acknowledge any of it until the CIA says they can.

Protests and Provocations

If it wasn’t obvious before, in light of last night’s assault on the US embassy in Yemen, it should be painfully evident that the 9/11&12 Middle East protests against the anti-Islam movie “The Innocence of Muslims” aren’t really protests, and they don’t really have a whole lot to do with the movie either (which may not even exist).

When the 9/11 protest in Cairo began, multiple witnesses reported that much of the crowd didn’t even know why they were there, and the first part of the protest largely involved people milling about as the reasons for the gathering was explained to them. They were told to show up, and they did – who told them to show up? (Some other important questions about the Cairo incident here)

I’ll get to that shortly.

The protesters were there was for one reason and one reason alone: to provoke a violent reaction by the guards protecting the embassy in order to generate backlash. If the protests at the embassy had turned into a sort of Kent State in Cairo, as I suspect they were supposed to, the attack on the Consulate in Benghazi would have seemed far more believable as a genuine protest gone wrong, and we would be facing the possibility of real grassroots protests across the Middle East.

The heroes of the day in Cairo were the on-site US Embassy guards, and their superiors who refused to fall victim to the provocation, and chose not to use force in an ambiguous and possibly threatening situation.

In Libya, however, the situation was substantially different. The incident at the Consulate in Libya was a preplanned assault on a predetermined target. Four pickup trucks full of armed men used grenades and RPGs to attack the Consulate compound in the middle of a rather small and unremarkable protest.

The debate, at this point, is whether there was coordination between the organizers of the protests in Cairo, and the attack in Benghazi. With the assault on the Yemeni embassy, the plot thickens.

Frankly, I’d be shocked if more than a few of the people at the embassy in Yemeni had any idea about the film. Like the protesters in Egypt, the film was really irrelevant – they were there at someone’s behest to provoke a reaction.

I suspect that what we’re seeing is a new approach to operations by Al Qaeda franchisees and affiliates.

In the absence of a central command, and with the loss of most of their senior planning staff, Al Qaeda can’t really pull off the large-scale operations that they used to be known for.  Instead, they are now engaged in the work of trying to rebuild some measure of unity and support in the Muslim world. Their goal here is to provoke some sort of high-profile disproportionate response by the US.

These events, coming on the heels of the release of the Weinstein video and the Zawahiri video, point to a much looser approach to AQ operations that are vaguely synchronized, but not really coordinated. (See also the attack in Somalia) This approach may be marginally successful in the short run, but it needs to produce major results ASAP, because it involves lots of groups committing to public action in a way that makes them easy targets for some very skilled and dangerous people.

Reasons to be optimistic about Libya's future.

Libya is free.

With the exception of a few pockets of resistance in Tripoli and some rogue military units elsewhere the Qaddafi regime has collapsed completely. 

Fursa sayiida, and Mabrouk to the people of Libya. It still hasn’t sunk in yet for me. The progress was frustratingly slow for the past two months but never a stalemate, despite what the skeptics said. Suddenly, over the past week the forces in the mountains started advancing by leaps and bounds, and more high profile defectors started slipping away. The actual conquest of Tripoli itself took less than 48 hours, and although Bab-AlAziza (Gaddafi’s super-villain compound) is not yet liberated, several of Gaddafi’s sons are in custody and G’s personal security forces laid down their arms yesterday (though there has been no specific mention the fate of his amazon bodyguard team). Misinformation and rumor surrounds the actual whereabouts of Brother Leader himself – some say dead, some say in custody, some say fled to Algeria or Chad.

None of that matters right now. The only important thing is that the Libyan people are now free.

So what comes next for Libya?

Prognostication is a dangerous business when one’s predictions are preserved and easily findable (my earlier overly optimistic comments about Gaddafi’s imminent departure are all still up on this blog). That being said, some outcomes are more likely than others.

As I’ve said before, Libya has certain advantages over many of the other Arab countries.

First of all, it has oil wealth. Not on the scale of countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but certainly enough to ensure funds for infrastructure rebuilding without borrowing money and signing away its future to the IMF and the world bank. Not only that, but the Gaddafi bank accounts that were frozen at the beginning of the NATO intervention will be opened to the National Transition Council, providing them with instant capital for reconstruction.

Secondly, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the collapse of the regime has been complete. Some of the more powerful tribal leaders may win big in an election scenario, but it’ll be pretty difficult for anyone with deep connections to the Libyan regime to retain much power unless they were among the first to leave . Libya will be taking their steps towards freedom without the entrenched power structures that Egypt and Tunisia are still struggling with. Guys like Mahmoud_Jibril, Abdul_Hafiz_Ghoga, and Mustafa_Abdul_Jalil were already on the outs with the regime when the uprising started, and if there’s one thing that the Libyan people are going to be wary of in the future it’s a strong central government. Don’t be surprised if the Libyan constitution places severe limits on the powers and authorities of their chief executive.

Third, Libya is reasonably situated for self-governance. Despite the general failure of the political system invented by Gaddafi and promulgated in his “Green Book”, an important aspect of the “Jamhariyya” is its heavy reliance on direct democracy for local governance. Although the system was severely hampered by the corruption and interference from nepotistic elites, the Libyan people are quite familiar with the democratic process, and 100% committed to self-governance.

Fourth, there is a strong sense of Libyan identity. This is not to say that Libya is homogeneous, and it is possible that some of the more traditional tribal elements will simply fade out of the state system (though the advantages of sharing in the state oil-wealth may serve as a counterbalance to this), but the shared tribulations of 41 years of Gaddafi, along with the sacrifice and unifying experience of the 2011 Libyan revolution has certainly created a powerful sense of Libyan unity.

I have high hopes for Libya.

(Note - here's a slightly less optimistic assessment over at The Arabist)

The situation in Libya - June

As we reach the 80 day mark of intervention in Libya, NATO has extended their mission by another 90 days, though my guess is that we have only a week or two left. The conclusion of the Libyan revolution is so close I can taste it.

Russia, who initially abstained from voting on the imposition of the no-fly-plus on Libya, finally voiced its support for the National Transitional Coucil (NTC). Jordan has also recognized the NTC and is in the process of establishing a diplomatic mission in Benghazi.

On Monday eight high-ranking libyan officers (five of whom were generals) who had escaped to Italy called on the remaining few generals to follow their example, and abandon the regime. Estimates place the number of remaining generals at less then ten. The degradation of Qaddafi’s command and control can be seen in the utter failure of his military to achieve anything resembling success against anything other than lightly armed mountain villages.

The police and military enforcement in Tripoli are now making heavy use of motorcycles, instead of the trucks and jeeps that were previously the norm, suggesting that the fuel shortage is at a critical stage. The humanitarian situation in Tripoli is reaching disastrous proportions, with food and water almost gone.

Tripoli is now seeing small protests and guerrilla attacks against the government on a daily basis, and the NATO bombings have accelerated over the past few days. Rumor has it that Qaddafi is sleeping in Tripoli-area hospitals for fear of coalition airstrikes.

Meanwhile the RAF has started to use Apache helicopters, enabling much more precise targeting for their strikes (though this comes at a somewhat higher risk to the pilots).

South African president Jacob Zuma visited Libya on Monday and met with Qaddafi to discuss a peace settlement. The outcome of the conversation was pretty much a bust – Qaddafi is adamant in his refusal to step down, which is a deal-breaker for the NTC. (shortly after Zuma left Tripoli the city was subjected to a massive wave of NATO air strikes)

Overall, things are still going slowly and steadily against Qaddafi.

Anyone who uses the word "stalemate" is in denial and/or an idiot.

How good were my weekend predictions?

I was occupied with other things this past weekend, so on Wednesday night I posted a few predictions about what the weekend might have in store. Let's look at how I did:

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Yemen - "Saleh is out by Monday or a full-fledged civil way will be underway"

Correct.

I know I hedged my bets with two possible outcomes, but between Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula taking over a town in south yemen, the entire Hashed tribe taking up arms against Saleh’s troops, Yemeni air force jet fighters doing air strikes on the Al-Qaida holdings and the Yemeni military attacking protesters elsewhere, I'd say this looks a lot like a civil war.

Interestingly enough, the opposition has insisted that they will continue to fight Al-Qaeda after Saleh is removed (and will even make a deal with the US to that effect). One of the reasons why the US has been tentative in its actions regarding Saleh is because he has actively participated in the US-led war on terror, particularly against AQAP. If the opposition can convince the State Dept that they are sincere in this offer it won't just peel the last vestiges of American support away from Saleh, it will actually earn the opposition some support (and probably some reconstruction funds from the US as well).

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Syria - "High profile military defections and major violence on Friday"

Relatively accurate (but pretty vague too).

There have been several defections, but nothing high profile. As far as major violence, the horrific torture, murder, and mutilation of 13 year old Hamza Ali al-Khateeb by Syrian state security has spurred larger and angrier protests. Syrians are beginning to take up arms against the military which means we may see something more akin to Libya unfolding over the next week.

Here's the facebook page - We are all Hamza Ali al-Khateeb

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Israe/Palestine - "Israeli Military strikes on Gaza within 24 hours of the permanent Rafah/Egypt border opening. Protesters get shot somewhere. Rockets from Gaza fail to hit anything."

I was off on all three points. This was a pretty pessimistic prediction on my part, and I’m happy to be wrong about this.

A few additional points on this topic - there haven’t been any missile attacks on Israel from gaza since the start of unity talks between Hamas and Fateh. This suggests two things -

1. Hamas doesn’t want to risk the talks falling through, so they’re keeping a tight lid on things.
Or
2. The assholes with the rockets are just waiting for the right time.

As far as protest-related violence, the Israeli military is expecting some next week in connection with the anniversary of the 1967 war (AKA the Six-day war).

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Libya - "Tunisian troops exchange fire with pro-Gaddafi forces along the border. 3-5 more countries recognize the NTC by Monday"

I was wrong on both counts, probably because other things are finally moving forward. Lots of big stuff is finally happening, I’ll have a new libya-specific blogpost up on Tuesday to bring you up to speed.

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Iran - "Ahmadinejad holds on to his authority for another week...barely."

Yea. His time seems to be rapidly running out, but he’s a pretty good at navigating the byzantine convolutions of the Iranian power game. After a week of bad news, Iran's supreme leader finally seems to be taking some of the pressure off of President Ahmadinejad.  If the President has convincingly been brought to heel he still has some life in him, but Khameni may just be setting him up for a bigger takedown.

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Pakistan - "Three more major domestic terrorist attacks by Monday"

Another one where I’m happy to be wrong. There was only one attack.

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Saudi Arabia - "More women driving in protest this weekend."

Nope. Just wishful thinking on my part. They formed a facebook group and tweeted about driving.

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USA - "Obama will say/do something that is immediately declared to be the worst thing ever by several Republican Congressmen and Fox news."

He chewed gum in public. Truly he is history's greatest monster. 

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Bahrain - "Nothing. No one will do anything to support the Bahraini people. Why? Because people suck sometimes."

Pretty much spot on, but the US has recalled a Human Rights diplomat from Bahrain due to a string of violent threats against him.

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So. There you have it. Not a great showing, but not a terrible one either.

Look for a post on Libya later today...

Weekend predictions

I don't usually go for predictions, but I'll be out of town this weekend, so instead of trying to liveblog from my brother's wedding I'll just do some predictions now and see how I did on Monday.

Yemen - Saleh is done. My guess is he'll be gone by Monday (or there will be a full-fledged civil way underway).

Syria - High profile military defections and major violence on Friday..

Israe/Palestine - Israeli Military strikes on Gaza within 24 hours of the permanent Rafah/Egypt border opening. Protesters get shot somewhere. Rockets from Gaza fail to hit anything.

Libya - Tunisian troops exchange fire with pro-Gaddafi forces along the border. 3-5 more countries recognize the NTC by Monday.

Iran - Ahmadinejad holds on to his authority for another week...barely.

Pakistan - three more major domestic terrorist attacks by Monday.

Saudi Arabia - more women driving in protest this weekend.

US - Obama will say/do something that is immediately declared to be the worst thing ever by several Republican Congressmen and Fox news.

Bahrain - Nothing. No one will do anything to support the Bahraini people. Why? Because people suck sometimes.

Three major shifts

Things seem to be picking up speed once again, and the last few days have seen some significant milestones for three of the countries we've been paying close attention to.

Yemen: frankly, my coverage of Yemen has been fairly weak compared to some of the other countries. Unfortunately, aside from some research I did several years ago concerning the reunification of North and South Yemen, it's not a country that I've really immersed myself in. Despite its small population, it is extremely diverse, with cultural influences coming from North and East Africa, Arabia, and South Asia, thanks to its advantageous location near the horn of Africa, the southern entrance to the Red Sea, and the coastal Arabian cities of Mecca and Medina.

Its glory days as a major link in both overland and sea trade are long past, and now it's largely known for his poverty and fractious infighting. two days ago, the GCC put forth a proposal whereby Saleh, the current president/dictator of Yemen would step down within the next 30 days, and free and fair elections would be held shortly thereafter in exchange for guarantees of immunity for himself and his people. Saleh seems to have accepted the plan (although that may not stand)  As encouraging as this news might be, there are some issues that do concern me.

1. The most obvious is the simple question of “will he leave office in 30 days?” It is, of course, entirely possible that he will abide by the GCC agreement, but he could also use the 30 day long to marshal his forces, eliminate key opposition members, and strengthen his position vis-à-vis the protesters in preparation for a major crackdown a month from now.

2. Then, there is the issue of the rest of the country. The idea of immunity from prosecution will likely stick in the craw of many who were on the receiving end of his brutality. Not only that, the protests in Yemen have been far less unified in any coherent sense than those in Egypt, Libya, or even Syria. Rather than a cohesive body of protesters, instead there are an abundant number of individual factions all of whom are interested in Saleh's departure from office, but with little shared objectives beyond that. A variety of post-election worst-case scenarios can be imagined, ranging from 1980s style Lebanese civil war to straight up Somalian style anarchy outside of a few controlled urban centers. As I've said from the beginning, I'm not all that optimistic about Yemen's potential for positive outcomes.

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Libya – Things are definitely moving forward, but unfortunately this means that the regime is getting more desperate in its actions. For the last three days the people of Misrata have been steadily cleaning buildings full of mercenary snipers, with a wide range of foreign nationals being taken into custody by freedom fighters. Captured merc units include Sudanese, Syrians, and Algerians (including an Algerian Colonel) as well as many Libyan soldiers (including a pro-Qaddafi General). As the pro-Qaddafi forces have been eradicated from their strongholds in the city, their support outside the city has taken to shelling the city more heavily.

The NATO strikes have certainly been moving things forward, taking down several of the Libyan state television stations and destroying two of the main buildings in Ghaddafi’s main compound in Tripoli Bab Al-Azizaya today. Additionally, the gas shortage in Tripoli has escalated to the point where there is none left for nonmilitary usage - this is bad news for everyone in the city, but ultimately it moves us that much closer to angry mobs dragging brother leader out into the streets.

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While Libya is moving closer to conclusion, Syria is ramping up. Blood in the streets. Tanks, live ammo. I highly recommend this piece http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2011/04/24/syrian-protesters-cut-down-weeds Body count is past 200, and still climbing. Not much to say. It’s awful.

More updates...

So here’s where we’re at: the old orders have dug their heels in. They will hold out as long as they can by any means necessary.

It’s been hard to write updates, because although things are happening, they are mostly small advances, or gradual increases in scale.

This is particularly true in Libya, where the freedom fighters have made remarkable strides, none of which seem dramatic to the outside observer. With elements of the former Libyan military leading the anti-Gaddafi campaign the dramatic back-and-forth capture of towns and cities has ended. The rebel army is moving steadily forward in a coordinated fashion, taking and holding key points as they move west.

The pro-Ghaddafi forces have taken a different track, turning their attention to the isolated towns in the mountainous regions, where they have been wreaking havoc outside of the NFZ/civilian defense umbrella. The results have been horrific, but there is little that the rebels can do to assist. Meanwhile, not far from Tripoli the rebel-held city of Misrata has continued in its persistent defiance of Ghaddafi’s repeated attacks. The fact that attacks have continued on the city speaks to its importance as a symbol for bothe sides of the conflict. As long as the rebels hold the city it cannot be said that the rebellion is simply a regional phenomenon, and the longer it holds out, the weaker Ghaddafi looks to his supporters.

Some highlights from the past 12 hours:

• NATO 18 Apr: 1 building destroyed near #Brega #Libya (nature of building not given)
• NATO 18 Apr: 3 tanks, 1 anti-aircraft weapon system and 1 armoured vehicle destroyed near Zintan
• NATO 18 Apr: 6 SAMs, 4 tanks, 3 air defence missile sites and 1 mobile rocket launcher were destroyed near Misrata
• NATO 18 Apr: 3 ammunition storage bunkers destroyed near Sirte
• NATO 18 April: 9 ammo bunkers and HQ of 32nd brigade destroyed in Tripoli
• CONFIRMED: NATO hit "Khamis Brigade" Gaddafi 's son HeadQuarter 10km South of Tripoli several times last night

As I’ve said before, despite the persistence of those who predict a Libyan stalemate the pro Ghaddafi forces are losing ground steadily. For more on the situation in misrata and Libya in general I will again direct you to libyafeb17.com

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Some regimes elsewhere have had some success in making concessions while controlling the protests – particualry Morocco and to a lesser extent Oman (though some things seems to be brewing there). Jordan and Lebanon seem to be far more concerned with issues of ethno-national self-identity than the otherwise prevalent issue of simple dignity (not because they aren’t concerned with dignity, but more because their very existence as nation-states is intimately intertwined with issues of ethnicity and self-identity)

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Syrian protests have grown continually since last week – Assad seems weirdly paralyzed by ambivalence, probably a result of his delay in responding to the situation quickly enough. This response-delay has been one of the hallmarks of the “Arab Spring” – the Arab leaders repeatedly ignored or neglected the stirrings of discontent, or answered them with half-assed measures to placate very serious concerns. Of course, now that the angry mobs have toppled two long-standing dictators the Middle Eastern regimes are taking them much more seriously.

Be that as it may, things might have already gone too far too fast for Assad. The Syrian regime was one of the few that was initially deemed safe from upheaval due to the regime’s chokehold on society in general, but even despite the brutality evidenced by his military and police force (who may be under the authority of one of his cousins) he still hasn’t taken a decisive step in any direction yet.

Slight side note - Friends who spent any amount of time in Syria always commented on the security that they felt while living and traveling there.

“There’s no crime!” they said. “I never felt unsafe the whole time I was there!”

Their enthusiasm reminds me of a comment by an older Italian man that I used to know who would regularly reminisce about Italy’s fascist era. “Under Mussolini, if someone would steal even a cabbage from your garden, he would leave a coin on the stem where he cut it off with his knife. ”

So, anyway, Syria’s protofascist era seems to be seriously at risk.

Yesterday one of the leading Sunni religious leaders publicly condemned the Assad regime for their indiscriminate actions against protesters and every day the protests grow steadily. Interestingly, the Syrian regime has set up several twitter accounts to flood the twitterverse (twittersphere?) with random minutia under the #Syria hashtag. This piece identifies some of the more prominent twitter spammers, but if you’re looking for a few reliable Syrian tweeters here are a few that I’ve been following:

https://twitter.com/SyrianJasmine
https://twitter.com/Shoruk_K
https://twitter.com/SilmyaSilmya
https://twitter.com/AnonymousSyria
https://twitter.com/SultanAlQassemi
https://twitter.com/shadihamid

Just an hour or two ago it was announced that the long-standing "Emergency Law" has been revoked (accompanied by an order outlawing the protests)
Too little too late, most likely.

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Yemen unfortunately hasn't been at the forefront of my radar, but here's a good timeline if you need to figure our where we're at: http://www.timetoast.com/timelines/131956 

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Bahrain continues to be brutal. The government has been employing vicious tactics to hold the protests at bay – bloggers and twitterers are being detained continually, brutality abounds, and dozens have died. I must emphasize that the death toll is deceptively small – Bahrain is a country with a population of a little over a million. The approximately 30 reported deaths in Bahrain are equivalent to 600 deaths in a country the size of Syria, or 2400 in a country the size of Egypt.

Saudi Arabia seems to have chosen Bahrain as a line in the sand, as though to say “political unrest will come no closer”, and given their ridiculous quantities of money they may be successful in quelling the uprising on behalf of the Bahraini royals, but I expect the cost to be terrible. This is a situation that desperately calls for a stronger voice from both the UN and the US, but any political wrangling that takes place will be messy and fraught with seriously negative outcomes for the US.

Bringing you up to speed...

Sorry for the rather substantial drop in output on my part. In the absence of any reasonable excuses, I’ll blame twitter. (You have been following my twitter feed, right?)

Well, there’s a lot to cover, so let’s get to it…

Libya still leads in the news, and at this point it seems as though the only thing holding the Libyan government together is utter terror. In addition to the defection Moussa Koussa on Sunday, another high profile defector got out of the country two days ago. As the article mentions, we aren’t seeing more defections because anyone who leaves the country without their family is endangering their lives.

The most substantial change In Libya has been General Abdel-Fattah Younis’ return to a military leadership role for the Liberation forces. Younis, a former Libyan Interior Minister, was one of the early high-profile defections from the pro-Ghaddafi camp. He initially assumed a leadership position, commanding a brigade of other Libyan army defectors. This created some conflict among the rebel forces, many of whom questioned his fitness for command (given his long career as a Libyan government insider). Additionally, the rapid initial success of the rebels had bolstered their confidence in their own ability to overcome Gaddafi’s military, and they wanted to preserve the spontaneous nature of the uprising, rather than rely on military assistance (this is also why they initially opposed the idea of a no-fly zone).

General Younis stepped back from his leadership role, and the anti-Gaddafi military forces took a backseat in the fighting until the rebels began to lose in a spectacular fashion a few weeks ago. Even with the advent of the NATO no-fly zone/civilian protection order, there seems to have been continuing debate over the military’s role in the revolution. It was only a few days ago that Younis was restored to his leadership role, something that probably should have happened some time ago.

With Younis in command, the rebels on the front lines (recklessly courageous, but under-equipped, untrained, and unguided) have been supplemented and/or replaced by actual soldiers. Facing stronger opposition, Gaddafi’s forces have redirected some of their attention to the small undefended southern towns that are opposing him but have not yet been integrated into the resistance.

As the Libyan conflict has unfolded, it has caused some major strategic realignment in both Africa and the Middle East. This can be seen in the recent actions of Algeria, Turkey, Jordan, and Qatar.

Algeria has been serving as a main conduit for the arms and mercenaries flowing towards Ghaddafi, a fact that will probably soon bite Algerian president Boutiflaka's regime in the ass. Like Libya, (and unlike Tunisia and Egypt) Algeria’s military serves as an enforcement wing of the ruling party, and Ghaddafi’s failure to stop the Libyan uprising with brute force means that Algeria may have a similar fate in store for them. Not only that, their actions in support of Ghaddafi will not likely be forgotten in a post-Gaddafi state.

Turkey’s role in the Libyan situation has been deeply ambivalent, which has created a great deal of frustration towards turkey on the part of many Libyans. Although they initially opposed intervention, they followed that by assuming a prominent role in NATO’s actions in the Med. They have tried to position themselves as potential interlocutors between Qaddafi and the rest of the world, while decrying his brutality but they don't seem to have been successful with either side of the conflict.

Jordan, on the other hand, has conclusively settled itself on the side of the Anti-Ghaddafi forces by becoming the third Arab country to contribute planes to the NFZ/civilian protection action. This may be a move by the King to strengthen his support among his base. Jordan is fairly unique, demographically - close to 2/3 of its population is ethnically Palestinian, which creates a very odd power dynamic. (Anyone who says that Palestinians are really Jordanians is slinging BS or playing semantic games). For a better understanding of the Jordanian situation (and why there won’t be a revolution in Jordan any time soon) I highly recommend this blog post. King Hussein of Jordan is a sharp guy, and the advantages of having good relations with the emerging new Libyan state are pretty clear.

Qatar, more than any other Arab nation, has recognized the opportunities that a new Libya represents. Their enthusiasm for the NFZ/civilian protection action was evident from the start. I get the impression that the Qatari government sees the future of the Arab world more clearly than any of their neighbors, and has been taking bold steps to ensure their place in it, despite their small size and limited oil resources. Towards this end, they have already signed agreements with the provisional government in Benghazi to purchase a tanker full of oil. (Note – most Libyan oil is what they call “Light Sweet Crude” - extremely high-grade oil that requires less refinement and purification than most other types of crude oil.)

All of these Libya-centered power struggles can be seen as expressions of a larger struggle – the push for stronger standing on the international stage and in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Saudi Arabia is probably the strongest player in the GCC, given their close ties to every US administration since Nixon and their staggering oil wealth. For the past 30+ years Saudi Arabia has been furthering its interests in a number of ways, and one of the most notable is the promulgation of its own distinctive Wahabist brand of Sunni Islam. Wahabism is a particularly conservative strain of Salafism, a strict back-to-basics rigidly fundamentalist form of Islam. Salafism, especially the Wahabist variations, has little tolerance for alternate interpretations of Islam and the Quran, which has created some serious conflicts within the Muslim world – especially with Shi’a and Sufi Muslims.

This is important to note because expressions of the Salafi vs. Sufi conflict have been flaring up in Egypt lately – in particular several Sufi shrines have recently been destroyed by Salafist mobs. Sufis regard the burial places of their saints and teachers as being somewhat sacred and often use them as places of prayer and pilgrimage, a practice that Salafis regard as tantamount to idolatry or even heresy. (Note – don’t confuse the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood. The MB represents and includes a much more diverse range of Islamic expression.)

I raise this issue because Saudi Arabia heavily funds their Salafist brethren in Egypt and the increasingly aggressive public actions by Egyptian Salafis carries the imprimatur of Saudi interference. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are not known for cordial relationships with each other, but the recent events are likely to drive even more wedges between the two states and push Egypt towards the other big player in the Gulf – Iran.

The Middle East realignment can also be seen in some notable recent events in Syria (though in some rather counterintuitive ways). Shortly after the protests in Daraa started rapidly escalating the King of Saudi Arabia called Bashir Assad to assure him of Saudi Support. This is strange for a number of reasons, but most particularly because for the past 40+ years Syria has been either loosely or tightly aligned with the Baathist/Nasserist bloc of Arab nationalists (particularly Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and to a lesser extent Libya and Algeria). This group has traditionally been locked in competition with the pan-Islamist royalists, especially Saudi Arabia. Not only that, but Assad, his family, and the rest of the Syrian government are Alawites, a sect of Shi’a Islam (remember what I just said about Salafis/Wahabis and Shi’a?).

One of the commonly heard chants in the streets of Syria last week was "No Iran, no Hezbollah, we want a Muslim who fears God." (it's catchier in Arabic) The accusation that Assad is insufficiently religious seems to have struck a nerve, and Assad seems to be trying to get more support from the religious conservatives in Syria by rolling back some of the social reforms of the past few years. (He’s not rolling back political reforms because there haven’t really been any) It could be that he’s backing away from Iran and towards Saudi Arabia to preserve his power structure. He's also taking big steps to gain the favor of Syria's substantial disenfranchised Kurdish population.

More on Syria's tenuous stability here.

Well…that’s plenty for now. Barring some other major upheaval I’ll be getting around to addressing Iraq and Bahrain this weekend.

Are there any good Qaddafi-themed poop jokes?

I feel constipated. Not physically, but creatively. It's not quite writers block, in fact it's almost the opposite. There are so many things that I am poised to write about, but all of them are waiting for a trigger, an event, a green light. There are rumblings, ominous portents, but everything is still half-baked.

I blame Qaddafi.

The message that Egypt and Tunisia sent to the rest of the Arab world was, "This can happen anywhere"

For the past two months, Qaddafi has been trying to send a very different message, "Not here, it can't"

Thankfully, this has not stemmed the flow of uprisings nor has it broken the will of protesters in Bahrain, Syria, or Yemen. Nonetheless, we didn’t get to see a dictator step down this past month.

However, instead of getting one in March, we may get two (or three) in April.

It looks like the endgame is in place for the old president of Cote d'Ivoire. Despite his best efforts, his army has evaporated out from underneath him. This is, presumably, in no small part due to the fact that by most estimates two thirds of the military voted for his opponent in the election. The new president and his supporters have retaken most of the country, and Gbagbo is conspicuously absent.

Yeah, I know, Cote d'Ivoire isn't part of the Middle East, but if you go back and look at the very first posts that I wrote for this blog, you'll notice that the post-election conflict was one of the issues that motivated me to start writing this. Certainly, the circumstances are quite different, but watching a despot fail in his attempts to retain power in the face of a populace whose patience has expired is nonetheless inspiring.

I know my predictions for Qaddafi's departure have so far been overly optimistic, but Gbagbo will very likely be gone by next week.

As far as Qaddafi goes, it is only a matter of time before he reaches the end of his rope. His failure to capture the eastern cities has deprived his forces of the additional fuel supplies they were hoping to seize, thereby mobility severely. Air-strikes on weapons depots have also drastically impacted his military capacity. His attempt to reinforce his weakened forces with additional mercenaries may buy him a few more days, but I think it is unlikely that he will retain control for more than another week. (I've been wrong before, but I think the end is in sight at last.)

Perhaps, once brother leader has been removed from his position this damnable constipation will be relieved.

Qaddafi, you are an impacted stool impeding the natural functions of democracy’s colon. I look forward to seeing you flushed down the toilet of history.

Why exactly are we involved in Libya?

It’s pretty simple, really – we’re there because it’s easy.

Easy is relative, of course, but Libya as a target for intervention has a lot going for it. A comically distinct leader with a history of deliberate regional destabilization and brutality, a wave of democracy sweeping across its North African neighbors, a defiant but outgunned domestic uprising, an eager coalition of international partners, a clear humanitarian disaster in the making, the unprecedented approval of the Arab League to take action against one of their own members, and the fact that whole business can be conducted via NATO’s 60-year-old military alliance using our allies’ airbases in the Mediterranean.

It’s just too easy.

We don’t even need to put troops on the ground, just fighter jets, gunships, cruise missiles, and drones.

We get to use up ordnance that was reaching its expiration date, give our pilots a little bit of combat practice, and generally make ourselves feel better about the Middle East and our role in it.

Jon Stewart explained this last night in terms of a ledger sheet and, grim as it may sound, there is an undeniable truth to the reality of the situation. The benefits of our actions must be weighed against their costs. It’s ugly, but it’s true.

Are we doing the right thing in Libya? I believe the answer to be yes.
Why then, are we not doing the right thing in places like Cote d’Ivoire, Bahrain or Syria?

Because it’s a whole lot more difficult in those places.

Syria and Bahrain are tangled messes that require a delicate negotiation of allies, potential allies, neighbors, repercussions, and regional instability that could severely impact our interests in the area.

Whereas Bahrain and Syria have close ties to other Middle East countries, Libya has steadily angered and alienated everyone else in the Arab-speaking world. (This is one of the main reasons he has given so much money to African regimes and the African Union - Qaddafi has spent billions on dictators across Africa in order to ensure their support for his various machinations. )

Right now Cote d’Ivoire is in the early stages of a civil war. How many of their neighboring countries are clamoring for our help to mitigate the thousands of fleeing refugees? What has the AU done to stop that conflict (or any other, for that matter)? Almost nothing – instead they rail against intervention. Gbagbo, the former president of Cote d’Ivoire, refuses to leave office despite having lost the election. Instead he is unleashing his military on the supporters of his opponent Outtara. Simultaneously he has vigorously supported Gaddafi and denounced any and all western intervention. (Interesting sidenote – in addition to his links to Gaddafi, Gbagbo has strong ties to some big name conservative Evangelical Christian movers and shakers in the US).

Furthermore, the scale of brutality in Bahrain and Syria hasn’t yet begun to approach what we’ve seen in Libya (though Syria should be watched closely – this Friday after evening prayers things will almost certainly get interesting). Getting NATO or Arab league approval for an action in Syria isn’t going to happen, and unilateral American intervention in the middle east went out with GWB.

In the case of Bahrain we have to weigh our actions within the context of our own involvement (the US 5th Fleet is docked in Bahrain) and the proximity of Iran, the entanglement of Saudi Arabia, and the fact that we’d be hard-pressed to achieve anything truly constructive by getting involved. It’s also not near Europe, and it’ll have to get a lot worse before Europeans would even think of getting involved. (And really, why would Europeans get involved? It doesn’t really impact them in the way that Libya does.)

So. American intervention in Libya. Easy.

Everywhere else. Messy and problematic.

A whole mess of updates from all over!

Friday is always a big day in the Middle East.  Just about every single major protest or rally that has taken place from Morocco to Iran has reached its peak after Friday evening prayers.  Yesterday was no exception, and today seems like a good day to sort out some of the events from the past few days and try and make sense of where things are in the Middle East.

The first point to mention is my recent entry into the world of Twitter. I’ve been following multiple Twitter feeds for quite some time (beginning back in 2009 with the Iranian post-election protests), but I’ve been leery of going any deeper into that chaotic yammering mass.  My time at the nonprofit technology conference last week however convinced me that it was no longer something I could reasonably avoid.

My Twitter name is ixakRubicon, but if you’re not on Twitter you can also see my “tweets” on the right column feed of this blog. I’ll be mostly using the feed to share links and “re tweet” notable tweets from other people that I’m following.  I promise, I won’t be using it to talk about my new haircut (which is spiffy), what I ate for breakfast (egg sandwich), or what the guy next to me on the train yesterday smelled like (urine).

If you are among the twitterati, please follow me. It gives my life purpose and meaning.

Now on to the things that matter:

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Libya - rebels are making progress once more.  Pro-Qadhafi forces have retreated from the besieged cities of Misrata and Ajdabiya.  There have also been reports of tanks and armored trucks being abandoned by the pro-Qadhafi forces because of fuel and ammunition shortages (remember what I said the other day about supply chains?).

White House comments on America's involvement in the NFZ+ can be found here if you missed them, with a more extensive speech coming on Monday. Steve Negus has some relevant comments over at thearabist.net - "Consensus vs Clarity"

The US role in the operation has been downgraded, with NATO taking the leadership role and the majority of the sorties being flown by French and British planes as well as several miscellaneous European countries and Canada.  Fighter planes from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are also participating, though it should be pointed out that Qatar is one of the only countries in the ME that hasn’t had major protests (it is also the home of Al Jazeera), and the UAE may have committed planes in order to buy themselves some slack for their participation in the Bahrain crackdown. Nonethless, the participation in this campaign by Arab governments should not be taken lightly.

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The United Arab Emirates have also made another interesting move with some ambiguous geopolitical ramifications. They have joined the African Union as officially recognized observers.  This is notable for a few reasons, most immediately the contrast between their active participation in airstrikes on Libya and the denunciation of those attacks by the African Union. Their respective diferences over Libya, this certainly indicates a heightened degree of interest in Africa by the UAE, presumably for commercial reasons, but potentially for other reasons as well.

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In Yemen,  talks of a potential  power transfer are under way, possibly over the next few days.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/26/us-yemen-idUSTRE72M92520110326

http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/26/yemen.president.interview/index.html

Frankly, this may be little more than a stalling tactic on the part of the current president - power would most likely be transferred into the hands of one of his supporters.  Despite the fact that nothing really seems to be happening beyond talking, it’s still too early to write off the power transfer idea. The fact that the people of Yemen have been able to push Saleh this far means that they can probably push further.

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On the topic of elections, Egypt’s Wafd party is showing its true colors, stating that they are opposed to any international election monitoring in the fall (Google translate version here). Reaction to the statement has yet to be seen on a wide scale, but initial reactions have been (predictably) outrage and anger by the youth who participated on the protest movement.

Another interesting event took place in Egypt as well.  Two of the men responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat were released from jail a few days ago. This is part of a very complex power play by the military that I’m still trying to decode. I’ll try to keep you apprised of the situation as clarity comes.

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Some interesting power struggles going on in Gaza as well, as Hamas tries to rein in the violent actions of Islamic Jihad.

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In Jordan there have been some protests calling for a transition to a constitutional monarchy, but it remains to be seen whether or not they will gain traction. There have also been robust counter-protests - The King of Jordan still enjoys strong support from certain sections of the country, and some angry rhetoric has been flying back and forth over the issue. A heartfelt and melancholy account of a March24 protest can be found here: "The Quick Death Of Shabab March 24 And What It Means For Jordan" I HIGHLY reccommend it. The author really cuts to the heart of the issue in Jordan, and why reform of the type that we are seeing elsewhere may be a long time coming in Jordan.

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The situation in Syria keeps getting more and more serious (or should I say Syrias?). Protesters burnt down a Baath party headquarters today and the protests continue to escalate in response to the governments violent attempts to suppress them.

An interesting consequence of the current situation in Syria is that Hezbollah has positioned itself very squarely on the side of Assad, a strategic decision that will probably come back to bite them in the ass later on.  The Alawite sect of Islam that Assad and his core supporters belong to is viewed with some suspicion by many of the more conventional Sunni Arabs of Syria.  The government’s close ties to the Shiites of Hezbollah and to the Iranian government have give the unhappy parts of the population ammunition for accusations of borderline heresy.

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On the topic of Iran, an additional point to mention – the US government is considering dropping Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) from the list of international terrorist organizations, a move that could have a serious negative impact on the homegrown Iranian green movement.  Excellent article describing the situation over at salon.com http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/03/26/iran_green_movement/index.html

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There is also some positive State Department news - they have developed a nifty piece of software called the “Panic Protester Button”, a phone app that can be activated if a protester is about to be arrested. If the “panic” button is pressed the phone immediately erases all saved contact information from the phone and sends an emergency alert to other activists. This useful little piece of software shows an encouraging degree of innovation and adaptability on the part of our own State Department, (though an independently developed third-party version probably has a better chance of widespread adoption in places where the US government is viewed with almost as much suspicion as the local government.

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One last thing to mention: Sudan – Protests against Omar al-Bashir are still trying to take off. I’ll keep you posted on those.

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Well, that’s all for now, thanks for tuning in, and don’t forget to follow me on Twitter!