Israel: winning battles, losing the war.

Spring is here!

As the old marching cadence goes, "what makes the grass grow?  Blood.  Blood.  Blood." 

Or, alternately, we can always hum few bars from Ween’s classic tune, "push the little daisies."

Revolutions are ugly things.  And revolutions happen because ugly things have been happening.

(Note, some of the links on this page will take you to videos and photographs of unpleasant things – consider yourself warned)

I'm sorry I haven't been updating every day, but with my limited time I often find myself having to choose between keeping up on things and writing about things.  As good as it feels to update my blog daily, there is also a value to me keeping abreast of the things I am presuming to write about.

So...A speedy Middle East overview:

At this point there are four main hotspots: Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria.

Algeria is still teetering on the brink, the events in Iraq are relatively indistinguishable from their state before the Arab Spring (I'm sorry to be so dismissive, but Iraq's problems are of a very different stripe than the rest of the Arab world).

Oman, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have all experienced protests, but not to the degree that their neighbors have.

Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait are all fairly quiet right now (one of the advantages of being small and rich). 

Egypt and Tunisia are pushing towards a post-autocratic future as best they can with varying degrees of success.

Iran and Lebanon have their own sort of equilibrium – both of them are seething under the surface, but not in any sort of fashion that is easy to explain to an unfamiliar observer. 

So I guess that's about where things stand right now.

Have I forgotten anything?

Oh.  Yeah.

Israel and Palestine. 

The Siamese twin arch-enemies.  Let's begin there, shall we?

As the protests and revolutions have spread throughout the middle east, Israel has been somewhat left out, which is just as well for them, given the turmoil that their own political situation is undergoing – splits in the dominant political party, controversies over military appointees, and the recent rape conviction of former president Moshe Katsav.

The most visible effects of the Arab spring in Israel have come in the form of a recent surge in mortar and grad rocket attacks on Israeli towns near the gaza border, the horrific murder of the Foegel family in the west bank settlement of Itamar, a bomb going off in Jerusalem, and Israel's military and political reactions to all of those events.

The thing is, these events aren’t actually expressions of the Arab Spring - they are instead desperate actions by groups who stand to lose influence and power in the event of a real Palestinian unity movement.  As I’ve stated before, these incidents are intended to goad Israel into a disproportionate response in order to generate support for the various militant Islamist organizations operating in Gaza. To say that they are the work of Hamas is not really accurate, but Hamas certainly stands to benefit from anything that draws attention away from themselves and catalyzes the public mood against Israel.

The degree to which Hamas fears a genuine Palestinian unity movement can be seen in the ferocity with which they lashed out against the rally in Gaza city last week – their power is slipping and they know it.

Anyway, a Palestinian unity movement would be disastrous for both Hamas and Fateh (And probably for the Israeli government as well).  So instead we get what we have seen over the past few days: a resumption of aggressive actions against Israel, and unflinching retaliation on the part of the Israeli military.  This actually creates an interesting opportunity for Israel's military industrial complex - the Iron Dome.

This is the next-generation of antimissile defense.  Radar guided antimissile missile launcher that detects rockets and shoots them out of the sky with faster rockets.

Israel is hoping to market these to other militaries, and the situation presents them with the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the units as "field-tested".  The IDF has stated that they will be moving one of the units into place over the next few days, so I guess that's something we can all look forward to watching.

Here’s The problem: with the implementation of the Iron Dome Israel may have a new weapon in their national defense arsenal, but the Palestinian people also have a new tool, the same one that has been used in Syria, Bahrain and Libya to powerful effect - the ubiquitous camera.

Watch this video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=218IEpLCPrE and think about its significance.

In the same way that the events of three days ago in the Syrian town of Daraa were being viewed around the world within a matter of minutes, and the way that the brutality of Libyan protesters shot to pieces by antiaircraft guns was immediately displayed for the world to see (I'm not going to give you a link - the pictures are horrific), the consequences of each and every one of Israel's actions will be looking out of computer monitors and smart phone screens across the Middle East and around the world.

When "Cast Lead" went into action in 2008, twitter did not exist, camera phones were still something of a novelty, and Facebook was still largely the domain of college students.

The world today is very different.

In 2009, when Neda, a young Iranian girl on her way to a piano lesson in Tehran was struck by a stray police bullet during the post-election protests she was dead in less than five minutes.  As bystanders tried to help her, one stood and filmed. The video of her death was online before her body was cold.

Over the past three days more than a dozen Palestinians have died in Israeli strikes - at least four of them children.  Many more will die in the days and weeks to come. Only some of them will have had any connection to the attacks on Israel, but all of their pictures will be posted on the internet.

Of course, Israel has cell phones with cameras as well, but pictures of a missile that didn't hit anything doesn't really have the same impact as shaky handheld footage of family members pulling their children out of the rubble of their parents’ houses.

Israel is making some very bad strategic decisions right now.

Bahrain, Palestine, and ... Armenia?

What the hell, Bahrain?

The Shiites have hit the fan in Bahrain – Bahraini police and military have been supplemented by more than 1000 Saudi Arabian troops (and some from the UAE), complete with tanks and armored trucks. At least eight people have been killed, with hundreds more injured. Police have been using live ammunition, and there are reports of them firing indiscriminately into crowds obstructing their path.
There has been significant outcry by Shiites in Iran and Iraq (not that Saudi Arabia cares), and at this point the Bahraini royal family has made it clear that they are little more than Satraps for the Saudi Government.

At this point, the violence in Bahrain also seems to be part of an internal power struggle in the Bahraini royal family. Much of the incoherence and inconsistency of the government’s response to the protests (alternating between tolerance and violence) stems from divisions between progressive and conservative elements. Although the progressives were in ascendancy for some time, the involvement of the Saudi government (who strongly back the conservative elements) has reversed that power balance

In conversations on Bahrain (and Yemen and Libya) a question comes up again and again – “Why are these governments so willing to resort to violence against their own people?”

The answer is a pretty simple one – traditionally the autocratic governments of the Middle East have held power through a judicious threefold mix:

a. propaganda,
b. intimidation
c. force

With the advent of widespread electronic communication (both internally and externally) the effectiveness of propaganda has dramatically shrunk. Intimidation still has some effectiveness, but Egypt and Tunisia have served as an example and an inspiration to protesters elsewhere, successfully hobbling the effectiveness of intimidation. Without these two, there is nothing left for a regime to call upon except for force.

“So why not find new options? Isn’t it obvious that the violence will only make it worse?”

Here’s the essential problem: There is no plan B.

As was painfully obvious in the case of Mubarak, the powers that be in the Middle East have been entirely unprepared for what has come to be called “the Arab spring”. The status quo in these countries has been firmly in place for decades, and the skills required to retain authority have had more to do with internal power plays among the elites. An evolutionary shift is underway, and few leaders, if any, have the right range of skills to navigate this new terrain.

***

Lots of stuff going on in Palestine/Israel – seized weapons from Iran, settlement building as collective punishment for the murders in Itamar, rumors of a Syria/Israel peace deal, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Abbas announced that he won’t be running for reelection – things are always exciting in the Levant.

All of that aside, the issue that I want to touch on is the Palestinian “Day of Rage” protests. There were rallies in Gaza and the West Bank for unity between Hamas and the PA. These expressions of frustration at the gridlock created by having two separate and opposing governments weren’t the product of efforts by either the PA or Hamas, but both Fateh and Hamas were quick to co-opt the rallies.

The protests in Gaza ended a bit early, when Hamas security decided that it was time for the crowds to disperse, and started beating people with clubs.

This speaks to an interesting and unfortunately often overlooked issue – legitimacy. At this point neither Hamas nor Fateh have any. Excepting the die-hard supporters of the two parties (who are often beneficiaries of a paternalistic carrot and stick approach to governance) most Palestinians are sick of both groups.

Mahmoud Abbas is acutely aware of this, and seems to have grown tired of being the whipping-boy for the Israeli government (After the murders in Itamar his public denunciation of the act was deemed insufficiently loud enough by Netanyahu, and he was told that he needed to make sure that the Palestinians heard him clearly – as if most of the Palestinians give a damn what Abbas says about anything).

Word is that Palestinian elections are about six months away, an event that probably wouldn’t favor Fateh or Hamas. Hamas only won the 2006 elections because internal divisions in Fateh split their voting bloc, and over the past few years Hamas has shown themselves to be just as corrupt and nepotistic as the party that they beat. They haven’t secured any visible gains for the Palestinians, and they haven’t shown much in the way of leadership – this has not gone unnoticed. Unless Fateh and/or Hamas can put up some fresh young faces soon they are both poised to lose significant power in the next election.

***

Just a quick third note – although Armenia’s inclusion in “the greater middle east” is debatable, they had some protests two weeks ago, and round two is today.

Worth watching for sure.

Terror, nonviolence, and Israel

A few years ago, during grad school I tried to write a paper on the concept of “Nonviolent terrorism”. The scope of the project quickly revealed itself to be far beyond the requirements of the class that I was writing it for, and instead I limited the focus of the paper to the performative aspects of self-immolation. (part one of that paper can be found here, part two and three are forthcoming)

The idea of nonviolent terrorism is one that is largely symbolic – actions that induce fear, chaos, and psychological trauma without causing physical harm to people or infrastructure. Bomb threats are probably the most common form of nonviolent terrorism, but other examples can be found – white powder in envelopes, firecrackers tossed into a tense crowd, psychological warfare through pranks. These things wear on the public psyche until it is like a tightly wound spring or a spooked horse unsure which way to jump - ready to protect itself from a threat whose likelihood cannot be clearly determined and whose severity cannot be calculated.

Nonviolent terrorism seeks to mimic the effects of a terrorist act without utilizing the destructive methods of terrorism. Nonviolent terrorism, however, does not exist seperate from terrorism – in fact, the success of an act of nonviolent terrorism is contingent on it being temporarily indistinguishable from a real act of terrorism. The act draws its potency from the real potential for violent terrorism. Threatening to poison a city’s drinking water can be an act of nonviolent terrorism. Threatening to destroy a city with the death ray from your moon base is something altogether different.

Nonviolent terrorism operates on the premise that the thing you fear hasn’t happened yet, but it might...

Israel is currently undergoing a wave of non-violent terrorism.

Let me be clear – I am not referring to the fear that more Gravads and Katushas will rain in from the Gaza strip, or the fear that a collapsing Lebanese government will become the puppet of Hezbollah, or the fear that the Muslim brotherhood will seize the reins of the fledgling Egyptian political scene and nullify the Israel/Egypt peace treaties.

All of these things are real fears, but none of these are the real fear.

The real fear comes from what we saw in Egypt. Less than a month ago millions of people filled the streets of Egypt, and in the face of police brutality and government force they stood their ground. Certainly there were acts of violence by the Egyptian protesters – clashes between hired baltagi and a public who was unwilling to be driven back, there was rock throwing and car burning in defiance of riot police, and there were a few nights where protesters in Tahrir square were pelted with firebombs and fought back with stones. But overall, it was a largely nonviolent movement, and therein lies the seeds of terror.

Certainly, when it comes to Egypt’s future some Israelis are hopeful and others are suspicious. But underneath it all there is a creeping and un-addressable gnawing fear that transcends concerns regarding the Egyptian people.

It is a fear that something like what we saw in Tahrir square could take place in Israel.

Every action by Hamas, or by the Palestinian Authority, or by the Palestinians themselves whether singly or in groups now brings with it the second-guessing - "Will this be the Mohamed Bouazizi moment?", "Is this the next Khaled Said?", "Could this be the thing that triggers it?"

As I said before, these things wear on the public psyche until it is like a tightly wound spring or a spooked horse unsure which way to jump - ready to protect itself from a threat whose likelihood cannot be clearly determined and whose severity cannot be calculated.

What would happen if 100,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel (AKA “Israeli Arabs”) showed up on Ben Yehuda street in Jerusalem demanding an end to the settlements?

What would happen if thousands of Gazan Palestinians marched from Gaza City and the refugee camps to the Erez and Karni crossings demanding passage to their estranged families in East Jerusalem and the West Bank?

What if the Muslim and Christian residents of Ramallah walked en masse to Ma’ale Adumim to protests the progressive loss of what little land they have left?

Most importantly, what if they did it with their hands empty of anything except for their camera phones?

How could Israel respond? And how long could large-scale human action in Israel stay nonviolent - either on the part of the Israelis or the Palestinians?

Because lurking behind the spectacle of Egypt is the specter of Libya: a population who no longer fear for their own lives facing down a military willing to use deadly force.

There is true terror.