News from Libya over the past few days has been alternately frustrating and depressing. The momentum of the opposition forces seems to have broken as they reached Qaddafi’s main strongholds of Sirte (his hometown) and Tripoli (the capital). Once they lost their inertia, Gaddafi was able to begin concerted counterattacks. Despite being numerically outnumbered, Gaddafi’s remaining troops are his most loyal and by extension, the best equipped and best trained soldiers.
However, despite the pessimism on the part of many, it is important to note that a war of attrition would not favor Gaddafi. To preserve his primary advantage (better weapons and equipment) he needs a robust support system for his forces – something that only comes with money, supply chains, and loyalty. The elite soldiers may still support him, but the logistical components of his army will be much harder to retain - mechanics, cooks, truck drivers, etc. are what make a military function in the long run, and at this point they are only likely to carry the army’s burden while under duress. This goes double for the air force support crew. The more sorties a plane flies, the greater its need for careful maintenance and repair (just ask US helicopter crews in Afghanistan), and the higher the risk of serious systems failure.
Qaddafi may be able to recapture some of his lost ground, and he may even successfully retake some of his oil and gas production/refinement areas, but the only strategic advantages those will afford him are morale-related. He won’t be able to resume gas exports – the people who kept the refineries operating were the foreign workers who evacuated weeks ago, and the home-grown Libyan work force is notoriously inadequate. Large portions of his funds have been frozen, he has few trading partners for whatever oil he may have - maybe Venezuela, but they don’t really need oil, they make plenty of their own.
There is also some good news today. The Arab league has asked the UN to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. (It is worthwhile to note that the countries most resistant to the idea were Syria, Yemen, and Algeria – all countries that are dealing with some precarious political situations, and have used violence against their own citizenry or are likely to do so in the near future.). This paves the way for a multilateral projection of force that is less likely to bite the US in the ass later. I’ve been pretty critical of a US-led no-fly zone, but the explicit approval of the Arab League significantly assuages my concerns.
The White House has already responded positively to the Arab League's statement, and Hillary Clinton will be meeting with one of the main Libyan opposition leaders shortly.
The pace has been excruciating, but I believe that the long-term outcome will be a good one.
Saturday, March 12, 2011
Friday, March 11, 2011
Insights on Egypt's future from Spain's past
I’ve been away from home for the past few days, which has made it difficult to do much writing, but being on the road (or in the air) has allowed me to do some catch-up reading that I’ve been meaning to get to.
In particular, I’ve had time to read and reflect on the state of Egypt, and its future hopes for a democratic society.
Oftentimes I’ve heard comments to the effect of “Arabs (or Egyptians) have no history of democratic governance, and so their transition to a democratic state is either impossible, unlikely, or at best far away.
The claim that Arabs or Egyptians have no history of democratic governance is far too dismissive of a broad-brush statement to be all that useful, but it is an argument that can be made, particularly within the context of the past century. Some fledgling attempts at democracy have taken place, but autocracy has generally been the norm in Egypt and in the wider MENA.
In the course of my reading over the past few days I was struck by a passage in the article “Spain After Franco” by Omar G. Encarnación
Spain’s transition from an autocratic dictatorial regime to a democratic one came about in a swift and unexpected fashion – few, if any saw it coming, and as the quotation above suggests, no credible precedent for democratic self-governance existed. After decades of alternating between dictators and civil war, Franco came to power in the 1930’s. Despite his alliance with Italy and Germany during the Second World War, and his ruthless methods of control (secret police, censorship, outlawing of rival political parties, intimidation, torture, arrests, etc.), by the 1950’s he was a strong Cold War ally of the US.
Regardless, within three years of Franco’s death in 1975 Spain was experienceing the successful and unprecedented process of full democratization despite the reticence of established military and religious institutions, the presence of an active domestic terrorist organization, competition between several highly contentious political movements, a major economic collapse, and the cultural scars of decades of brutal repression. An attempt at a military coup failed miserably in 1981, and a year later Spain joined NATO and elected its first non-fascist government in more than four decades.
I highly recommend Encarnacion’s paper – it’s less than ten pages long, but it offers some useful insights and some promising hints towards a positive future for Egypt.
In particular, I’ve had time to read and reflect on the state of Egypt, and its future hopes for a democratic society.
Oftentimes I’ve heard comments to the effect of “Arabs (or Egyptians) have no history of democratic governance, and so their transition to a democratic state is either impossible, unlikely, or at best far away.
The claim that Arabs or Egyptians have no history of democratic governance is far too dismissive of a broad-brush statement to be all that useful, but it is an argument that can be made, particularly within the context of the past century. Some fledgling attempts at democracy have taken place, but autocracy has generally been the norm in Egypt and in the wider MENA.
In the course of my reading over the past few days I was struck by a passage in the article “Spain After Franco” by Omar G. Encarnación
“The country’s previous and only significant attempt at living under a democratic system (the brief and chaotic Second Republic, 1931–36) descended into civil war and cemented Spain’s reputation as a society in which conflict and the potential for violence were ever-present.”I came across the piece while looking for historical insights into possible future directions for Egyptian democracy. In light of the recent disruptions to the Egyptian State Security apparatus, I’ve been looking at a variety of precedents on how post-revolution societies deal with the remnants of the institutions of repression. Argentina, Chile, and South Africa have provided some insights for potential models and outcomes, but post-Franco Spain seems to be fertile ground for clues to a post-Mubarak Egypt.
Spain’s transition from an autocratic dictatorial regime to a democratic one came about in a swift and unexpected fashion – few, if any saw it coming, and as the quotation above suggests, no credible precedent for democratic self-governance existed. After decades of alternating between dictators and civil war, Franco came to power in the 1930’s. Despite his alliance with Italy and Germany during the Second World War, and his ruthless methods of control (secret police, censorship, outlawing of rival political parties, intimidation, torture, arrests, etc.), by the 1950’s he was a strong Cold War ally of the US.
Regardless, within three years of Franco’s death in 1975 Spain was experienceing the successful and unprecedented process of full democratization despite the reticence of established military and religious institutions, the presence of an active domestic terrorist organization, competition between several highly contentious political movements, a major economic collapse, and the cultural scars of decades of brutal repression. An attempt at a military coup failed miserably in 1981, and a year later Spain joined NATO and elected its first non-fascist government in more than four decades.
I highly recommend Encarnacion’s paper – it’s less than ten pages long, but it offers some useful insights and some promising hints towards a positive future for Egypt.
Thursday, March 10, 2011
Out of town
I'll try to get a post up tomorrow, but I don't have a reliable internet connection right now.
Monday, March 7, 2011
Hey, what about the rest of Africa?
All the things I’m missing
Looking back over on the six weeks or so that I've been writing this blog I'm struck by two things: how much I’ve covered, and how much I haven't even begun to touch on.
Most notably, I've barely mentioned Iraq, where some really dramatic events are taking place, but there are several other countries in the greater Middle East that haven't gotten much mention at all - particularly the “-stans”, but also other significant portions of Muslim Africa like Mauritina, Somalia and Djibouti, all of which are in the midst of the things that are in and of themselves, just as important as any of the events I've described a this blog.
This, of course, raises the question of “what exactly is the Middle East?" The answer to that question is an ambiguous mix of history, language, culture, and geography - a deeper examination of that can be found here.
Beyond the simple issue of what is or is not the Middle East, it is important to draw attention to a larger conceptual and philosophical issue. Although the seeds of the events we are seeing today were planted long ago, the event that really kicked it off was the one that took place in Tunisia. From that point forward, the eyes of the western world have been on Libya and Egypt for the past several weeks, with regular glances over to the Arabian Peninsula.
But, in spite of all that, why do we care so much about what happens in the Middle East/North Africa and so little about what happens in the rest of Africa?
I’d like to use this blog to address the wider issue of Africa, beginning with a bit of speculation, and then some comments and updates that, while far from comprehensive, may at least inspire you to look in a few new directions over the next several weeks and months.
Let me preface this by saying that I am not well versed in African history. In the past I've had the good fortune to share a house with several remarkable individuals from Benin and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and through conversations with them and the simple act of living alongside them I have acquired some small slivers of understanding with regards the cultures of these two countries. I've also had a decent enough education in European history to understand some of the colonial circumstances that led up to the current conditions we see today.
I don't really know much about sub-Saharan Africa, but I've got a pretty good idea as to why I don’t know much about it.
First of all, it should be pointed out that Africa is big. Really big. You just won't believe how vastly hugely mind-bogglingly big it is. I mean, you may think it's a long way down the road to the convenience store, but that's just peanuts to Africa. To really understand the size of the continent it's worthwhile to look at this map.
Then there’s the linguistic situation – unlike South America, which is also a huge continent with dozens of countries, there is no common language that is spoken almost universally across the entire landmass. Take, for example, my dear friend Alex. A young man in his 20’s from the Democratic Republic of Congo, he speaks seven distinct languages fluently – Bembe/Ichibemba, Efe, Lengala, Mboko, Kinyarwanda, Swahili, French, and English (this is not to mention dialects). Most of his linguistic range was developed in only two countries - DRC and neighboring Rwanda, and many of them aren’t spoken outside of small distinct geographic regions. (English was a latecomer; he had only begun to speak it after his arrival to America a year earlier.)
French will get you by in some parts of Africa, Arabic in others, Swahili in some, Hausa elsewhere, English or Afrikaans in other places - every country has multiple languages, and even multiple dialects within those languages. There is no one language that can carry you across Africa in a way that Arabic can take you all the way across the Middle East. Africa contains 53 countries, and even a well-educated scholar would have trouble identifying even a fifth them on an unlabeled map. (You're welcome to try to prove me wrong, here's an online quiz)
This linguistic and geographic complexity, combined with the limited (for now) strategic importance of Africa to the global economy means that for most people, the effort required to familiarize oneself with the continent of Africa seems to be a rather daunting task with little reward involved.
Even in the course of writing this blog, I have become ashamed of the limits to my own knowledge on Africa.
In fact, here’s a challenge – lets learn the names of all of the African countries and their capitals, and be able to locate them on an unlabeled map. I’ll commit to this for sure. We'll see how I do at the end of the year (maybe I'll make a YouTube video for you).
So, anyway, Africa.
The impact of the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian revolutions has been felt elsewhere in Africa, and more importantly, there are a number of events taking place in sub-Saharan Africa that may be as momentous as anything in the Arab world. But, don’t expect to see many of them on the news.
Let's begin (use this map for reference)
First of all, there is Cote d’ivore (AKA the Ivory Coast), which seems to be the most pressing situation. The country was on the verge of civil war over a disputed election before the first protests hit the streets of Tunisia. A predominantly French-speaking country of more than 20 million people, the former president has refused to step down after losing the 2010 election by a 46/54 margin.
The old president, Laurent Gbagbo, denied the accuracy of the election results, and claimed victory 52/48 in the opposite direction. Gbagbo is standing his ground, while the true winner, Alassane Ouattara, has been sworn in and established his own government. As a result, there are two separate and opposing governments in Cote d’ivore, and the armed clashes between them have been steadily escalating, with more than 300 deaths since December. (Some background here)
Most horrifying were the events late last week, where Gbagbo’s soldiers fired on a group of unarmed women at a rally for Ouattara, killing six. Gbagbo has also cut power and water supplies to the country’s north (largely under the control of Ouattara supporters) which may trigger a resumption of the 2002/2003 North/South civil war.
Not only are UN peacekeepers unable to protect the civilian population, they themselves are being targete by pro-Gbagbo forces, and thousands of people are fleeing the violence and unrest.
Gabon – not far from Cote d’ivore, is a small country of about 1.5 million that has been experiencing widespread protests for the past month. The current president, Ali Ondimba entered office in late 2009, and is the son of the previous president (who entered office in 1967 and had a long history of disputed elections). A pan-African news agency describes the situation thusly:
Neighboring Camaroon, with a population more than ten times that of Gabon is also undergoing protests and forceful repression, but has received almost no news coverage in the west.
Zimbabwe, with a population of nearly 13 million, is experiencing a degree of uneasiness that seems to point to a brewing revolution. In particular, the government has arrested dozens of of potential protesters and activists for the simple act of watching the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions on television.
Although some have argued that the country is not yet ready for a revolution, the fact that the government would take these actions suggests that they are concerned that the unrest in North Africa could spread south, and some dissenting voices say that revolution should not be ruled out.
Angola, a country of close to 20 million, has long been the site of unrest and violence, including a 15 year long bloody civil war from 1975-1990. The current leader, José Eduardo dos Santos has been in power for 32 years, and protests loosely modeled on those seen in the Middle East were planned for today. These have been organized using the facebook+text message+word of mouth method – those interesting in seeing if the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions can be exported elsewhere would do well to watch Angola very closely. (English version here)
Tanzania – I’ve been reading Katebomb’s blog pretty regularly, and she’s been writing some great stuff on the situation there. Rather than trying to sum up I'll just point you there.
Understanding Africa sometimes seems like a hopeless task - it seems so unstable and chaotic and overwhelming and we don’t have the deep geopolitical connections to Africa that we have in the Middle East. There are a whole host of reasons for this (don’t say it’s because Africa doesn’t have oil. Africa has lots of oil) Size and complexity is a factor as well, but I think the real reason why we as Americans don’t get Africa is that Africa doesn’t have any countries that are players on the world stage. The big powerhouses are in Europe, North America and Asia.
Well...maybe powerhouses aren't where the story is anymore.
Looking back over on the six weeks or so that I've been writing this blog I'm struck by two things: how much I’ve covered, and how much I haven't even begun to touch on.
Most notably, I've barely mentioned Iraq, where some really dramatic events are taking place, but there are several other countries in the greater Middle East that haven't gotten much mention at all - particularly the “-stans”, but also other significant portions of Muslim Africa like Mauritina, Somalia and Djibouti, all of which are in the midst of the things that are in and of themselves, just as important as any of the events I've described a this blog.
This, of course, raises the question of “what exactly is the Middle East?" The answer to that question is an ambiguous mix of history, language, culture, and geography - a deeper examination of that can be found here.
Beyond the simple issue of what is or is not the Middle East, it is important to draw attention to a larger conceptual and philosophical issue. Although the seeds of the events we are seeing today were planted long ago, the event that really kicked it off was the one that took place in Tunisia. From that point forward, the eyes of the western world have been on Libya and Egypt for the past several weeks, with regular glances over to the Arabian Peninsula.
But, in spite of all that, why do we care so much about what happens in the Middle East/North Africa and so little about what happens in the rest of Africa?
I’d like to use this blog to address the wider issue of Africa, beginning with a bit of speculation, and then some comments and updates that, while far from comprehensive, may at least inspire you to look in a few new directions over the next several weeks and months.
Let me preface this by saying that I am not well versed in African history. In the past I've had the good fortune to share a house with several remarkable individuals from Benin and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and through conversations with them and the simple act of living alongside them I have acquired some small slivers of understanding with regards the cultures of these two countries. I've also had a decent enough education in European history to understand some of the colonial circumstances that led up to the current conditions we see today.
I don't really know much about sub-Saharan Africa, but I've got a pretty good idea as to why I don’t know much about it.
First of all, it should be pointed out that Africa is big. Really big. You just won't believe how vastly hugely mind-bogglingly big it is. I mean, you may think it's a long way down the road to the convenience store, but that's just peanuts to Africa. To really understand the size of the continent it's worthwhile to look at this map.
Then there’s the linguistic situation – unlike South America, which is also a huge continent with dozens of countries, there is no common language that is spoken almost universally across the entire landmass. Take, for example, my dear friend Alex. A young man in his 20’s from the Democratic Republic of Congo, he speaks seven distinct languages fluently – Bembe/Ichibemba, Efe, Lengala, Mboko, Kinyarwanda, Swahili, French, and English (this is not to mention dialects). Most of his linguistic range was developed in only two countries - DRC and neighboring Rwanda, and many of them aren’t spoken outside of small distinct geographic regions. (English was a latecomer; he had only begun to speak it after his arrival to America a year earlier.)
French will get you by in some parts of Africa, Arabic in others, Swahili in some, Hausa elsewhere, English or Afrikaans in other places - every country has multiple languages, and even multiple dialects within those languages. There is no one language that can carry you across Africa in a way that Arabic can take you all the way across the Middle East. Africa contains 53 countries, and even a well-educated scholar would have trouble identifying even a fifth them on an unlabeled map. (You're welcome to try to prove me wrong, here's an online quiz)
This linguistic and geographic complexity, combined with the limited (for now) strategic importance of Africa to the global economy means that for most people, the effort required to familiarize oneself with the continent of Africa seems to be a rather daunting task with little reward involved.
Even in the course of writing this blog, I have become ashamed of the limits to my own knowledge on Africa.
In fact, here’s a challenge – lets learn the names of all of the African countries and their capitals, and be able to locate them on an unlabeled map. I’ll commit to this for sure. We'll see how I do at the end of the year (maybe I'll make a YouTube video for you).
So, anyway, Africa.
The impact of the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian revolutions has been felt elsewhere in Africa, and more importantly, there are a number of events taking place in sub-Saharan Africa that may be as momentous as anything in the Arab world. But, don’t expect to see many of them on the news.
Let's begin (use this map for reference)
First of all, there is Cote d’ivore (AKA the Ivory Coast), which seems to be the most pressing situation. The country was on the verge of civil war over a disputed election before the first protests hit the streets of Tunisia. A predominantly French-speaking country of more than 20 million people, the former president has refused to step down after losing the 2010 election by a 46/54 margin.
The old president, Laurent Gbagbo, denied the accuracy of the election results, and claimed victory 52/48 in the opposite direction. Gbagbo is standing his ground, while the true winner, Alassane Ouattara, has been sworn in and established his own government. As a result, there are two separate and opposing governments in Cote d’ivore, and the armed clashes between them have been steadily escalating, with more than 300 deaths since December. (Some background here)
Most horrifying were the events late last week, where Gbagbo’s soldiers fired on a group of unarmed women at a rally for Ouattara, killing six. Gbagbo has also cut power and water supplies to the country’s north (largely under the control of Ouattara supporters) which may trigger a resumption of the 2002/2003 North/South civil war.
Not only are UN peacekeepers unable to protect the civilian population, they themselves are being targete by pro-Gbagbo forces, and thousands of people are fleeing the violence and unrest.
Gabon – not far from Cote d’ivore, is a small country of about 1.5 million that has been experiencing widespread protests for the past month. The current president, Ali Ondimba entered office in late 2009, and is the son of the previous president (who entered office in 1967 and had a long history of disputed elections). A pan-African news agency describes the situation thusly:
It’s understandable that protests in Gabon haven’t captured the world’s attention. Gabon is a small nation, with a population of 1.5 million, and very few casual newspaper readers could place it accurately on a map. But this lack of attention has consequences. As protests unfolded in Libreville, opposition leader André Mba Obame – who likely won the 2009 election – and his leading advisors took sanctuary in the UNDP's compound in the city, fearing arrest by Ali Bongo’s forces. According to recent Facebook posts, Obame and his advisors are facing steady pressure from UNDP to vacate the premises, and have already been ordered to surrender their cellphones.
Neighboring Camaroon, with a population more than ten times that of Gabon is also undergoing protests and forceful repression, but has received almost no news coverage in the west.
Zimbabwe, with a population of nearly 13 million, is experiencing a degree of uneasiness that seems to point to a brewing revolution. In particular, the government has arrested dozens of of potential protesters and activists for the simple act of watching the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions on television.
Although some have argued that the country is not yet ready for a revolution, the fact that the government would take these actions suggests that they are concerned that the unrest in North Africa could spread south, and some dissenting voices say that revolution should not be ruled out.
Angola, a country of close to 20 million, has long been the site of unrest and violence, including a 15 year long bloody civil war from 1975-1990. The current leader, José Eduardo dos Santos has been in power for 32 years, and protests loosely modeled on those seen in the Middle East were planned for today. These have been organized using the facebook+text message+word of mouth method – those interesting in seeing if the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions can be exported elsewhere would do well to watch Angola very closely. (English version here)
Tanzania – I’ve been reading Katebomb’s blog pretty regularly, and she’s been writing some great stuff on the situation there. Rather than trying to sum up I'll just point you there.
Understanding Africa sometimes seems like a hopeless task - it seems so unstable and chaotic and overwhelming and we don’t have the deep geopolitical connections to Africa that we have in the Middle East. There are a whole host of reasons for this (don’t say it’s because Africa doesn’t have oil. Africa has lots of oil) Size and complexity is a factor as well, but I think the real reason why we as Americans don’t get Africa is that Africa doesn’t have any countries that are players on the world stage. The big powerhouses are in Europe, North America and Asia.
Well...maybe powerhouses aren't where the story is anymore.
Still playing catch-up
I haven't been able to finish either of the pieces I'm in the middle of, so I didn't get around to posting any updates on Sunday. Instead you should check out Juan Cole's post, "Top Ten Achievements of Mideast Democracy Protests this Weekend" over at Informed Comment.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
Amazing events in Egypt today and yesterday
Just a quick post today, I'm sorry it's been a few days since my last one, but I've been trying to finish several more in-depth posts, and they take a little longer than my conventional updates and snark. I’ll have another post up soon, probably not today but certainly tomorrow. (This blogging stuff is a lot of work!)
I mostly just wanted to bring your attention to two very interesting things that happened in Egypt over the last few days.
First of all, Thursday night something incredible happened.
The Prime Minister of Egypt was a guest on a popular Egyptian late night TV talk show and he spent about an hour and a half reiterating double-talk and vague patronizing fluff regarding the next steps for the Egyptian government. (That’s not the incredible thing)
After 90 minutes of his pandering bullshit, the host suddenly brought in additional guests – two well-known and respected Egyptian journalists who sat down and gave the Prime Minister the grilling of his life. The show continued for another two hours and the heavy back-and-forth basically made the PM look like a myopic tool, an out-of-touch jerk, and a blatant holdover from the Mubarak regime.
The only word to describe this is unprecedented. Even Lebanon, which has a fairly healthy and robust fourth estate, has never experienced anything like this - a prominent head of state being called on his crap in front of a nation of viewers.
Unprecedented.
As if that simple but momentous act of accountability was not enough, Friday morning brought with another bombshell: the Prime Minister had resigned.
It's not clear if he resigned due to his own humiliation, or if he was told to step down because his actions showed him to be so obviously unfit to lead. Regardless, it's an amazing event, and one that should be celebrated by everyone who appreciates the power of a free press.
Egyptian blogger Zenobia gives a wonderfully entertaining account of this event here.
The Prime Minister's replacement, Essam Sharaf, has a very good reputation as an effective minister and a supporter of the Egyptian protesters. Profiles of him can be found here and here. (Thank you to MEI editor Michael Dunn for the links)
***
As exciting and encouraging as this event was, today something even more remarkable happened.
First, a moment of context: Shortly after Mubarak stepped down from his position as Egypt's President, "rioters" burned down a police headquarters. The circumstances of the incident were such that it was painfully obvious to everyone that the culprits were Egyptian police/State Security personnel intent on destroying the evidence of decades of wrongdoing preserved in the station archives. This was followed by another incident two days ago where another police station was set on fire, destroying countless more files documenting thousands of additional corrupt and brutal acts against the Egyptian people.
Today, clashes between Egyptian State Security (secret police) officers and protesters took place in Alexandria outside of an infamous state security building where documents were being destroyed. In this situation, however, the violence was escalating dramatically, and the military intervened when State Security snipers were beginning to fire on the protesters. The security forces were dragged off by the army and the building was secured by the Egyptian people! Many documents were lost, but many others were saved.
Zenobia has an amazing account of this as well.
This bodes well for the new Egyptian century, and very poorly for the butchers and thugs of its past.
It’s going to be pretty interesting...
I mostly just wanted to bring your attention to two very interesting things that happened in Egypt over the last few days.
First of all, Thursday night something incredible happened.
The Prime Minister of Egypt was a guest on a popular Egyptian late night TV talk show and he spent about an hour and a half reiterating double-talk and vague patronizing fluff regarding the next steps for the Egyptian government. (That’s not the incredible thing)
After 90 minutes of his pandering bullshit, the host suddenly brought in additional guests – two well-known and respected Egyptian journalists who sat down and gave the Prime Minister the grilling of his life. The show continued for another two hours and the heavy back-and-forth basically made the PM look like a myopic tool, an out-of-touch jerk, and a blatant holdover from the Mubarak regime.
The only word to describe this is unprecedented. Even Lebanon, which has a fairly healthy and robust fourth estate, has never experienced anything like this - a prominent head of state being called on his crap in front of a nation of viewers.
Unprecedented.
As if that simple but momentous act of accountability was not enough, Friday morning brought with another bombshell: the Prime Minister had resigned.
It's not clear if he resigned due to his own humiliation, or if he was told to step down because his actions showed him to be so obviously unfit to lead. Regardless, it's an amazing event, and one that should be celebrated by everyone who appreciates the power of a free press.
Egyptian blogger Zenobia gives a wonderfully entertaining account of this event here.
The Prime Minister's replacement, Essam Sharaf, has a very good reputation as an effective minister and a supporter of the Egyptian protesters. Profiles of him can be found here and here. (Thank you to MEI editor Michael Dunn for the links)
***
As exciting and encouraging as this event was, today something even more remarkable happened.
First, a moment of context: Shortly after Mubarak stepped down from his position as Egypt's President, "rioters" burned down a police headquarters. The circumstances of the incident were such that it was painfully obvious to everyone that the culprits were Egyptian police/State Security personnel intent on destroying the evidence of decades of wrongdoing preserved in the station archives. This was followed by another incident two days ago where another police station was set on fire, destroying countless more files documenting thousands of additional corrupt and brutal acts against the Egyptian people.
Today, clashes between Egyptian State Security (secret police) officers and protesters took place in Alexandria outside of an infamous state security building where documents were being destroyed. In this situation, however, the violence was escalating dramatically, and the military intervened when State Security snipers were beginning to fire on the protesters. The security forces were dragged off by the army and the building was secured by the Egyptian people! Many documents were lost, but many others were saved.
Zenobia has an amazing account of this as well.
This bodes well for the new Egyptian century, and very poorly for the butchers and thugs of its past.
It’s going to be pretty interesting...
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
February was an interesting month, wasn’t it? Wait till you see what's next.
February was an interesting month, wasn’t it?
Mark my words, March will be even more interesting.
***
Egypt and Tunisia still have a long way to go, though Tunisia has finally lifted its state of emergency, and Egypt is fast tracking elections. I’ll try to keep you apprised of those situations as best I can, but it won’t be easy given how much other stuff is coming down the pipeline. Updates are probably going to come in the form of links, rather than summaries.
If you're interested in the current power structure in Egypt, Issandr el Amrani over at the arabist.net has put up a particularly informative post that's worth checking out.
***
Iran – The March 1 protests were notably different than those seen previously, particularly in the degree to which violence has been a factor. Although the Feb14 protesters did suffer a few attacks, and the 2009 protests saw several clashes between the protesters and the police/militia, yesterday there was much more rapid aggression on the part of the police (including deployment of riot squads) and the crowds (which were notably larger than the Feb14 crowds) were quick to counter with violence of their own. A recap of the days events can be found here.
Prominent opposition leaders Moussavi and Karroubi, already under house arrest, may have been recently imprisoned by the Iranian government. The government denies this, however, saying it is only propaganda generated by the MKO. (Not than anyone believes them)
The Iranian government began utilizing an interesting tactic in response to the tech-driven nature of the protests – anyone (particularly youth) walking or driving in the area near where the planned protests planned took place was stopped by police. The police checked their ID and searched their bags/pockets. Anyone with a phone, camera, or laptop was then photographed. This represents a frighteningly smart shift in the government’s efforts to counter the protests, and provides them with a fairly comprehensive database of tech/media savvy youth that may or may not be connected to the protests. The database will doubtlessly be used to identify potential activists for targeted monitoring.
There is good news as well - some unrest among Iranian labor groups has begun to surface. As I said before, the Green Movement has little hope of success if it doesn't gain traction among the trade unions and merchants.
***
Saudi Arabia has done an interesting thing...and by interesting I mean, awful with ominous portent for the future.
Shooting random Saudi facebook protest-organizers is not a good way to tell the world that you are secure in the legitimacy of your mandate to lead.
***
Over in Libya, Qaddafi is holed up in Tripoli with the last of his army, periodically making attacks on nearby cities. This situation has gotten so bad that the supposedly elite Khamis Bragade has been unable to break through the defenses of a civilian uprising.
Looking back at my post from Saturday, it seems that I was less generous than I should have been with regards to how long brother leader’s regime will stand – with close to 90% of the country lost (geographically and demographically) the only thing keeping Qaddafi afloat now is the hard-line loyalists, his mercenaries, and his fanatical self-confidence and delusion.
Regardless, the inevitability of such a thing is virtually inarguable.
Intervention seems to be a faint possibility, but at this point the most important services that our (and by “our” I mean “American”) troops can do is be prepared to deliver services to a country in desperate
need of food and medical supplies.
The possibility of a no-fly zone may be moving closer, but given the relative speed of your average United Nations resolution versus the pace of this particular revolution, it seems unlikely that we will see anything resembling the enforced no-fly zone that that we saw in Iraq during the last few years of the 20th century. Furthermore, it seems that many of the recent reports of air attacks against protesters and anti-government forces are not actually air attacks, but halfhearted overtures of attack, followed by deliberate mis-targeting that harms no one. There has even been at least one reported case of a Libyan pilot deliberately injecting from his plane, deliberately crashing it into an open field rather than fire on Libyan citizens.
Regardless, the longer this conflict continues, the greater the likelihood of intervention.
In terms of Libya’s outlook for the future - it’s anybody’s guess, but some scenarios seem more likely than others.
The two that I have seen cited most often are worlds apart – stable constitutional democracy or fragmentation. (note: both of these scenarios are contingent on the absence of US/UK/UN intervention. If external forces are involved then the dynamic changes rather dramatically.)
Libya does have few advantages over egypt and Tunisia.
1. When this grisly scene finally reaches its conclusion, there won’t be much left of the old guard. Some of the more powerful tribal leaders will certainly win big in an election scenario, but it’ll be pretty difficult for anyone with deep connections to the Libyan regime to retain much power. Libya will be taking their steps towards freedom without the entrenched pwer structures that Egypt and Tunisia are still struggling with.
2. Despite the general failure of the political system invented by Gaddafi and promulgated in his “Green Book”, an important aspect of the “Jamhariyya” is its heavy reliance on direct democracy for local governance. Although the system was severely hampered by the corruption and interference from nepotistic elites, the Libyan people are quite familiar with the democratic process.
3. Lack of diversity – Libya has a strong sense of self identity. This is not to say that Libya is homogeneous, but its religious and ethnic minority populations are quite small - this is also good because it means they are less likely to be seen as a political, cultural, or demographic threat and can more comfortably be integrated into the process of democratization.
However, some inclinations towards chaos are also present, particularly the inter-tribal rivalries that Gaddafi has spent decades exploiting. I am fairly optimistic about the potential for good outcomes but the issue of vendetta and retaliation is very real, and will probably be with us for years if a vehicle resolution is not in place.
This is an issue that many countries face in the aftermath of heavily repressive regimes, and a variety of coping methods have been used by the dazed and damaged populations as they emerge from under the boot of oppression. I’ll try to get a post up in the next few days on how South Africa, Spain and Argentina handled the ghost of their bloody and brutal history – there are important lessons to be learned from all three examples.
***
The most notable “I sure didn’t see that one coming” from the past week is Oman. I know a thing or two about Oman (I did some work for the Sultan Qaboos Cultural Center when I was interning at the Middle East Institute) and the Sultan has a reputation for being progressive and forward thinking, so I was particularly surprised to see that they, too, are not immune from the momentum of the Arab Spring. I’ll be putting up a piece on Oman, Sultan Qaboos, and Ibadi Islam in the next few days - stay tuned.
(In the meantime you can scroll through a piece on Frankincense that I put together for the SQCC five years ago - I think some of it got lost when it was posted online, but it's still a fun little piece)
Mark my words, March will be even more interesting.
***
Egypt and Tunisia still have a long way to go, though Tunisia has finally lifted its state of emergency, and Egypt is fast tracking elections. I’ll try to keep you apprised of those situations as best I can, but it won’t be easy given how much other stuff is coming down the pipeline. Updates are probably going to come in the form of links, rather than summaries.
If you're interested in the current power structure in Egypt, Issandr el Amrani over at the arabist.net has put up a particularly informative post that's worth checking out.
***
Iran – The March 1 protests were notably different than those seen previously, particularly in the degree to which violence has been a factor. Although the Feb14 protesters did suffer a few attacks, and the 2009 protests saw several clashes between the protesters and the police/militia, yesterday there was much more rapid aggression on the part of the police (including deployment of riot squads) and the crowds (which were notably larger than the Feb14 crowds) were quick to counter with violence of their own. A recap of the days events can be found here.
Prominent opposition leaders Moussavi and Karroubi, already under house arrest, may have been recently imprisoned by the Iranian government. The government denies this, however, saying it is only propaganda generated by the MKO. (Not than anyone believes them)
The Iranian government began utilizing an interesting tactic in response to the tech-driven nature of the protests – anyone (particularly youth) walking or driving in the area near where the planned protests planned took place was stopped by police. The police checked their ID and searched their bags/pockets. Anyone with a phone, camera, or laptop was then photographed. This represents a frighteningly smart shift in the government’s efforts to counter the protests, and provides them with a fairly comprehensive database of tech/media savvy youth that may or may not be connected to the protests. The database will doubtlessly be used to identify potential activists for targeted monitoring.
There is good news as well - some unrest among Iranian labor groups has begun to surface. As I said before, the Green Movement has little hope of success if it doesn't gain traction among the trade unions and merchants.
***
Saudi Arabia has done an interesting thing...and by interesting I mean, awful with ominous portent for the future.
Shooting random Saudi facebook protest-organizers is not a good way to tell the world that you are secure in the legitimacy of your mandate to lead.
***
Over in Libya, Qaddafi is holed up in Tripoli with the last of his army, periodically making attacks on nearby cities. This situation has gotten so bad that the supposedly elite Khamis Bragade has been unable to break through the defenses of a civilian uprising.
Looking back at my post from Saturday, it seems that I was less generous than I should have been with regards to how long brother leader’s regime will stand – with close to 90% of the country lost (geographically and demographically) the only thing keeping Qaddafi afloat now is the hard-line loyalists, his mercenaries, and his fanatical self-confidence and delusion.
Regardless, the inevitability of such a thing is virtually inarguable.
Intervention seems to be a faint possibility, but at this point the most important services that our (and by “our” I mean “American”) troops can do is be prepared to deliver services to a country in desperate
need of food and medical supplies.
The possibility of a no-fly zone may be moving closer, but given the relative speed of your average United Nations resolution versus the pace of this particular revolution, it seems unlikely that we will see anything resembling the enforced no-fly zone that that we saw in Iraq during the last few years of the 20th century. Furthermore, it seems that many of the recent reports of air attacks against protesters and anti-government forces are not actually air attacks, but halfhearted overtures of attack, followed by deliberate mis-targeting that harms no one. There has even been at least one reported case of a Libyan pilot deliberately injecting from his plane, deliberately crashing it into an open field rather than fire on Libyan citizens.
Regardless, the longer this conflict continues, the greater the likelihood of intervention.
In terms of Libya’s outlook for the future - it’s anybody’s guess, but some scenarios seem more likely than others.
The two that I have seen cited most often are worlds apart – stable constitutional democracy or fragmentation. (note: both of these scenarios are contingent on the absence of US/UK/UN intervention. If external forces are involved then the dynamic changes rather dramatically.)
Libya does have few advantages over egypt and Tunisia.
1. When this grisly scene finally reaches its conclusion, there won’t be much left of the old guard. Some of the more powerful tribal leaders will certainly win big in an election scenario, but it’ll be pretty difficult for anyone with deep connections to the Libyan regime to retain much power. Libya will be taking their steps towards freedom without the entrenched pwer structures that Egypt and Tunisia are still struggling with.
2. Despite the general failure of the political system invented by Gaddafi and promulgated in his “Green Book”, an important aspect of the “Jamhariyya” is its heavy reliance on direct democracy for local governance. Although the system was severely hampered by the corruption and interference from nepotistic elites, the Libyan people are quite familiar with the democratic process.
3. Lack of diversity – Libya has a strong sense of self identity. This is not to say that Libya is homogeneous, but its religious and ethnic minority populations are quite small - this is also good because it means they are less likely to be seen as a political, cultural, or demographic threat and can more comfortably be integrated into the process of democratization.
However, some inclinations towards chaos are also present, particularly the inter-tribal rivalries that Gaddafi has spent decades exploiting. I am fairly optimistic about the potential for good outcomes but the issue of vendetta and retaliation is very real, and will probably be with us for years if a vehicle resolution is not in place.
This is an issue that many countries face in the aftermath of heavily repressive regimes, and a variety of coping methods have been used by the dazed and damaged populations as they emerge from under the boot of oppression. I’ll try to get a post up in the next few days on how South Africa, Spain and Argentina handled the ghost of their bloody and brutal history – there are important lessons to be learned from all three examples.
***
The most notable “I sure didn’t see that one coming” from the past week is Oman. I know a thing or two about Oman (I did some work for the Sultan Qaboos Cultural Center when I was interning at the Middle East Institute) and the Sultan has a reputation for being progressive and forward thinking, so I was particularly surprised to see that they, too, are not immune from the momentum of the Arab Spring. I’ll be putting up a piece on Oman, Sultan Qaboos, and Ibadi Islam in the next few days - stay tuned.
(In the meantime you can scroll through a piece on Frankincense that I put together for the SQCC five years ago - I think some of it got lost when it was posted online, but it's still a fun little piece)
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